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INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation examines the process and consequences of nonprofits becoming important 
players in determining and supporting public service provision, in the context of parks and 
recreation services in large U.S. cities. It contributes to the theory and practices of public and 
nonprofit management in two major aspects. From a public policy and public management 
perspective, local governments are facing ongoing fiscal stress and therefore actively seeking to 
form partnerships with nongovernmental entities. However, such practices present new 
challenges for public and nonprofit managers, and pose challenges to the capacity of local 
governments. This dissertation offers a thorough and timely examination of the antecedence, 
processes, and consequences of these public-nonprofit partnerships.  
 
From a theoretical perspective, existing literature of government-nonprofit relationships, cross-
sectoral collaboration, and coproduction rarely talk to each other and they all focus on the role of 
nonprofits as a producer or co-producer of public services. Existing research in this area 
therefore focuses on the impact of public funding on the behaviors of nonprofit organizations. 
The role of nonprofits in financing, creating, and planning public services is largely overlooked. 
By focusing on local parks and recreation services in large U.S. cities, this dissertation builds a 
unique longitudinal dataset and uses multiple methods to examine the relationships between 
governments and nonprofits when there is a reverse funding flow from nonprofits to 
governments. It not only offers new empirical evidence for a new public service sub-sector, but 
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also contributes to the theory development of government-nonprofit relationships in terms of 
how nonprofits may influence government and how these relationships are governed.  
 
More specifically, I examine the role of nonprofit organizations in determining and supporting 
public service provision from three distinctive yet interconnected angles. In the first chapter of 
the dissertation, Understanding Nonprofit Support for Public Services: Moving from Co-
production to Co-governance, I investigate whether nonprofits’ involvement in public service 
planning and design, or co-governance, is a distinct type of nonprofit support for public services, 
and under what circumstances nonprofits are more likely to be involved in the planning and 
design of public services. The findings suggest co-governance, although not as prevalent, is 
indeed a distinct type of nonprofit support for public services. Nonprofits are more likely to get 
involved in co-governance when they are larger and younger, and operate in communities which 
are resourceful, stable, socially diverse, and has weak government capacity in providing 
corresponding public services. 
 
In the second chapter, Nonprofit Spending and Government Provision of Public Services: 
Testing Theories of Government-Nonprofit Relationships, I examine several prominent 
theoretical models of government-nonprofit relationships to answer the question of how 
expenditures of park-supporting charities influence public spending on parks and recreation 
services. I bring in the critical mass theory, construct a unique panel dataset that contains 
nonprofit and city government spending on parks, and use multiple panel data analysis models to 
answer this question. The findings suggest that nonprofit spending on parks in a city has a non-
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linear decreasing effect on public spending on parks, which supports the market niche model. In 
addition, this relationship is mainly driven by local governments’ non-capital expenditures on 
parks. This chapter suggests that government-nonprofit relationships are not identical when the 
direction of funding flow differs in subsectors. The critical mass theory and non-linear models 
are promising ways of disentangling complex relationships between nonprofits and governments.   
 
In Chapter 3, Governing Public-Nonprofit Partnerships: Linking Governance Mechanisms to 
Collaboration Stages, I investigate how these public-nonprofit partnerships are governed and 
how these governance mechanisms are linked to the different stages of the collaboration 
continuum. To answer this question, I use a grounded-theory-based comparative case study 
approach and conduct interviews with the leaders of public-nonprofit partnerships for city parks 
in major cities of the Ohio River Basin Region. Four governance mechanisms are developed in 
this chapter: government representation on the nonprofit board, reaching a formal agreement, 
building relationships, and building leadership capacity. These governance mechanisms are also 
likely to play different roles in different stages of the collaboration continuum.  
 
In conclusion, this dissertation uses multiple methods to examine the determinants, consequences, 
and governance mechanisms of public-nonprofit partnerships for the provision of parks and 
recreation services in large U.S. cities. Chapter 1, 2, and 3 provides detailed examinations of the 
above issues in the form of three research papers. In the conclusion of the dissertation, I 
summarize the overall findings and discuss the implications of this dissertation for future 
research. This dissertation advances our understanding of a new area of nonprofit and public 
management research, built at the intersection of nonprofit management, coproduction, 
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collaborative public management, and environmental governance. It is especially relevant when 
governments at different levels are suffering from fiscal stress and relying more on public-
private partnerships for public service provision. 
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CHAPTER 1 
UNDERSTANDING NONPROFIT SUPPORT FOR PUBLIC SERVICES:  
MOVING FROM CO-PRODUCTION TO CO-GOVERNANCE 
 
Abstract: 
Informed by the literature of co-production, this paper develops a theoretical framework for 
nonprofits’ involvement in the planning of public services or co-governance, and empirically 
tests it by utilizing a unique dataset of park-supporting nonprofits in large U.S. cities. The 
findings of exploratory factor analysis suggest that co-governance, although not as prevalent, is 
indeed a distinct type of nonprofit support for public services. The multilevel logistic regression 
analysis suggests that nonprofits are more likely to get involved in co-governance when they are 
larger and younger, and operate in communities which are resourceful, stable, socially diverse, 
and has weak government capacity in providing corresponding public services. The proportion of 
donative income is not a determinant of nonprofit involvement in co-governance.  
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Introduction 
Exemplified by administrative reforms in New Zealand and later in Western Europe and in the 
USA in the 1980s and 1990s, New Public Management (NPM) began to take shape. Public 
management borrowed the management practices from the private sector and contracting 
becomes a widespread practice of American governments at different levels (Salamon 2002; 
Kettl 2002). Government agencies are increasingly using indirect management tools and network 
arrangement to deliver public services (Kettl, 2002; Salamon, 2002; O’Toole, 1997). Nonprofit 
organizations, or the third sector in general, receive increasing attention from public management 
research because of their prominent role in the provision and production of public services 
(Smith & Lipsky, 1993; Brandsen & Pestoff, 2006).  
 
Despite this surge of academic interest in government-nonprofit collaboration in public service 
provision (Gazley & Guo, 2015), existing literature focuses on the instrumental orientations of 
nonprofits’ involvement in the delivery of public services. The key question is how nonprofits 
can serve as a more efficient alternative in producing public services, compared with 
governments delivering these services on their own? Nonprofits are still largely excluded from 
the creation, design, and planning of public services. Although this conceptual distinction 
between provision and production provides analytical clarity in discussing the role of nonprofit 
organizations in public services, the boundary between nonprofits’ involvement in public service 
provision and production seems to be not as clear. This limitation is amplified when 
governments at all levels experience fiscal stress and increasingly rely on nonprofit organizations 
for funding public services (Nelson & Gazley, 2014; Gazley, Cheng, & LaFontant, 2015). 
Scholars are actively seeking ways to obtain a complete understanding of nonprofit support for 
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public services, both regarding their service production and provision functions (Fyall, 2016; 
Mosley, 2012; Brandsen & Pestoff, 2006).  
 
Literature in governance offers a promising alternative in understanding the role of nonprofit 
organizations in public services. Governance concerns with about how different sectors interact 
with each other and engage in joint decision making (Klijn, 2012). It emphasizes the facilitation 
role and cross-boundary management challenges of conductive public organizations (Agranoff, 
2012). Denhardt and Denhardt (2000, 2015) developed the idea of new public service to 
characterize the new feature of modern government: serving rather than steering. The proper role 
of the government is not to decide what citizens need to have. Its role is to serve the citizens to 
help them reach their goals through various mechanisms. In this new framework of governance, 
the key question is how governments and nonprofits could go beyond coproductive relationships 
and jointly plan and design public services. Brandsen and Pestoff (2006) characterized this type 
of arrangement in which nonprofits participate in the planning of public services as co-
governance.  
 
Informed by the literature of co-production, this paper develops a theoretical framework for 
nonprofits’ involvement in the planning and design, or the co-governance of public services. 
Situated in the context of 204 park-supporting nonprofits in large U.S. cities, this paper answers 
two main research questions: 1) Is nonprofits’ involvement in public service planning and design, 
or co-governance, a distinct form of nonprofit support for public services? 2) What are the key 
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contextual and organizational factors that determine whether a nonprofit gets involved in the 
planning and design of public services?  
 
This paper makes several theoretical and empirical contributions to the literature of government-
nonprofit relationships, public service management, and coproduction. First, by focusing on local 
parks and recreation services in which nonprofits are documented to play a significant role in 
funding and supporting public services, this study provides one of the first empirical studies so 
far that focus on the role of nonprofit organizations in service planning and design. Earlier 
studies pointed out that such a role of nonprofit organizations tends to be missing or 
underdeveloped (Tsukamoto & Nishimura, 2006; Osborne & McLaughlin, 2004). There is 
therefore little empirical evidence or very few actual cases that directly deal with the role of 
nonprofits in public service planning and design.  
 
Second, this empirical research builds on existing typologies of coproduction and provides a 
timely contribution to our understanding of the variations of coproduction, especially at the 
collective level. By using factor analysis and content analysis of these park-supporting nonprofits’ 
websites, this study offers a broad range of public service supporting activities of these 
nonprofits and the patterns of such activities. It also provides the empirical tests of whether the 
distinction between co-governance and co-production is valid in characterizing government-
nonprofit cooperation in public service provision. 
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Finally, this paper offers a comprehensive theoretical framework that takes both organizational 
and community level characteristics into consideration. Multilevel logistic regression analysis is 
also the suitable analytical tool in testing the framework and disentangling the nested data 
structure (park-supporting nonprofits are nested in cities) of the model. By including local 
governments’ capacity of providing public services in the theoretical model, this paper offers a 
more nuanced understanding of government-nonprofit relationships and how these relationships 
may influence nonprofits’ involvement in different phases of public service provision.  
 
The next section presents co-governance, nonprofits’ participation in public service design and 
planning, as a distinct form of nonprofit support for public services. A theoretical framework is 
then presented to understand under what conditions nonprofits are more likely to engage in 
public service design and planning activities. Several hypotheses are developed from this 
framework. The paper then briefly describes the context of this study and empirically tests these 
hypotheses using a unique dataset that contains information about the finances of park-
supporting nonprofits, community characteristics, and government spending on parks and 
recreation services. The paper concludes by discussing the implications of the findings for public 
service provision and theory building in government-nonprofit relationships.   
 
Co-governance as a Distinct Type of Nonprofit Support for Public Services 
Within the political science and public administration literature, coproduction is an important 
theoretical framework for understanding citizens’ involvement in public service provision. 
According to the theory of coproduction, citizens’ involvement in public service delivery can 
 10 
 
possibly improve the cost-effectiveness and quality of public services. This concept can be traced 
back to the Ostroms in the 1970s when they studied metropolitan governance and the nature of 
public economies (Aligica & Boettke, 2009). The Ostroms used coproduction to reflect the fact 
that the value of public services cannot be fully captured without an informed and active 
involvement of service users (1977).  Parks et al. further elaborated the concept as “a mixing of 
the productive efforts of regular and consumer producers” (1981, p. 1002).  
 
From the origin of this idea, scholars have pointed out the possibility for both individual citizens 
and groups (a distinction is occasionally made between informal groups or formal organizations) 
to get involved in this type of joint production of public services. Parks et al. (1981) used a group 
effort of parents and students in improving education services to illustrate the concept of 
coproduction. Brudney and England (1983) pointed out the importance of collective forms of 
coproduction and further developed three types of coproduction under the umbrella term 
“coproduction”: individual coproduction, group coproduction, and collective coproduction. In a 
recent review of coproduction typologies, Nabatchi, Sancino, and Sicilia (2017) used the 
example of local parks departments working with citizens to support parks and recreation 
services as a typical form of collective coproduction, which provides social benefits to the whole 
community. Informal local volunteer groups or formal friends’ organizations of the parks often 
play an instrumental role in facilitating and organizing citizens’ involvement in such services. 
 
Although there may be potential risks of overlooking incidental inputs by citizens by focusing on 
institutionalized types of coproduction (Brandsen & Honingh, 2015), the benefits are equally 
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appealing. Coproduction is not resource-free (Bovaird & Loeffler, 2012) and it may be better 
coordinated by formal organizations, such as neighborhood associations or charitable nonprofit 
organizations (Paarlberg & Gen, 2009). Therefore, by studying organizational level coproduction, 
we may have a better understanding of how such efforts are organized and sustained. Recently, 
as governments at all level suffer from ongoing fiscal stress and nonprofits taking important roles 
in public service provision, there is a surge of academic interest in the role of the third sector in 
public service provision (Brandsen & Pestoff, 2006).  
 
The original conceptualization of coproduction mainly treated coproduction as an alternative 
mechanism for public service delivery. However, scholars soon found that this is not enough to 
cover the vast array of activities citizens are involved in public service provision. Coproduction 
thus became an umbrella term to describe all sorts of citizen support and engagement in public 
services (Nabatchi, Sancino, & Sicilia, 2017; Verschuere, Brandsen, & Pestoff, 2012). Despite 
some efforts in separating coproduction from co-provision (Ferris, 1984), co-creation (Voorberg, 
Bekkers, & Tummers, 2014), co-management (Brandsen & Pestoff, 2006), and co-governance 
(Osborne & McLaughlin, 2004), those terms are generally used interchangeably in the literature 
(Osborne & Strokosch, 2013).  
 
For the purpose of this paper, I will not dive into the definition of coproduction. Instead, the 
discussion will be developed based on the consensus of current literature on coproduction. 
Scholars have recognized that the phases of public policy or public service cycle serve as a 
significant role in characterizing different types of coproduction, both at the individual and 
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organizational level. Nabatchi, Sancino, and Sicilia (2017) developed a typology of coproduction 
based on “the use of coproduction during the phases of the service cycle” (p.6). Co-
commissioning and co-designing focus on the planning and designing phases of public services, 
while co-delivery and co-assessment focus on the implementation and evaluation of these 
services. Brandsen & Pestoff (2006) developed a typology of co-production by distinguishing 
between public service planning (co-governance) and public service production (co-management 
and co-production). Based on the degree of citizen involvement in public services, Voorberg et al. 
(2014) developed three roles citizens may play in public service provision: citizen as a co-
implementer, citizen as a co-designer, and citizen as an initiator. Based on such distinctions, they 
further pointed out that it may be better to distinguish between co-creation and co-production. 
Co-creation is achieved when citizens serve as the co-initiator or co-designer of public services. 
Co-production instead mainly focuses on citizens’ involvement in the actual delivery or 
implementation of public service. Following such a distinction between coproduction and co-
governance/co-creation, I separate co-governance as a distinct form of nonprofit support for 
public services and ask the question of under what conditions a nonprofit gets involved in the 
planning and design of public services. Although co-creation and co-governance can be used 
interchangeably in the context of this study, I use co-governance mainly because it is a concept 
developed more centered on nonprofit organizations while co-creation focuses more on citizen 
level involvement in public services.  
 
Determinants of Nonprofits’ Involvement in the Co-governance of Public Services 
Prior literature has identified a variety of community and organizational factors that may 
influence nonprofits’ involvement in public service delivery and provision. I propose four 
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community capacity related factors and three organizational capacity related factors that may 
influence nonprofits’ participation in public service planning and design. Figure 1-1 is presented 
to summarize the theoretical framework and corresponding hypotheses.    
 
Figure 1-1: Theoretical Model for Nonprofits’ involvement in Co-Governance 
 
 
 
Community’s Financial and Human Resources 
Community’s financial and human resources play a substantial role in mobilizing and supporting 
collective activities. Since the task of public service design and planning requires professional 
knowledge and particular expertise in that public service subsector, human capital and collective 
skills play a critical role in enabling the community to engage in such activities. In addition, 
communities with more financial resources are likely to generate more financial support for local 
nonprofit organizations, such as donation and earned income opportunities. These resources in 
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turn will support nonprofit organizations to get engaged in more complex public service 
supporting activities. Although resource-poor communities are likely to generate more demand 
for coproduction, existing research has consistently shown that supply-side considerations are 
more important in terms of generating philanthropic support and citizen engagement in public 
service provision. Grønbjerg and Paarlberg (2001) found that income and education were 
positively related to the density of nonprofit organizations in local communities. Using the case 
of k-12 public education, Paarlberg and Gen (2009) also found that community’s human and 
financial resources had significant positive impact on the formation and magnitude of nonprofit 
support for public services. I therefore expect community’s human and financial resources to 
increase the likelihood of nonprofits’ involvement in co-governance.   
Hypothesis 1-1: The likelihood of a nonprofit’s involvement in public service planning and 
design is positively correlated with the level of financial and human resources of the community 
in which the nonprofit operates. 
 
Community Stability 
In addition to a community’s financial and human resources, community stability also plays an 
important role in shaping citizens’ willingness and long-term commitment to supporting public 
services. Getting involved in the planning and design of public services requires extensive 
investments from citizens in the community. It is not likely to happen when residents come and 
go, thus not being able to enjoy the long-term benefits of such investments. More stable 
communities are also more likely to have a higher level of trust between citizens and government 
officials. In the context of parks and recreation services, a park master plan process can easily 
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take years and require multiple public meetings to get the plan finalized and passed. Without 
committed residents in the community and a certain level of community stability, it is very 
challenging for nonprofits to stay through this complicated process. The local homeownership 
rate is often used in previous literature as indicators of community stability and citizens’ long-
term commitment to the community (Paarlberg & Yoshioka, 2016).  
Hypothesis 1-2: The likelihood of a nonprofit’s involvement in public service planning and 
design is positively correlated with the stability of the community in which the nonprofit 
operates. 
 
Social Diversity 
Social diversity is one of the key reasons for nonprofits to engage in public goods provision. 
Because of the constraints of the democratic voting system, local governments tend to produce 
public goods at the level that satisfied the median voter (Hansmann, 1987; Weisbrod, 1988). A 
more socially diverse community represents more heterogeneous demands for local public goods 
provision, therefore presenting challenges for local governments to meet the demand of all their 
citizens. These residents who are unsatisfied with the current level of public good provision by 
local government, or the high demanders, are likely to create and support nonprofit organizations 
to satisfy these unmet demands. It also increases the likelihood of nonprofits’ involvement in 
public service design and planning. Based on such rationale, the following hypothesis can be 
developed:  
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Hypothesis 1-3: The likelihood of a nonprofit’s involvement in public service planning and 
design is positively correlated with the social diversity of the community in which the nonprofit 
operates. 
 
Government Capacity 
The ability of local authorities in providing certain services is another factor that may influence 
whether nonprofits decide to fill in the gap and provide multiple services, especially when those 
nonprofits do not rely on governments for funding. Therefore, everything else being equal, I 
propose that it is more likely for nonprofits to get involved in co-governance when the capacity 
of local government is relatively weak in meeting the demand of local citizens. Compared with 
contracting out public services to nonprofit organizations, involving nonprofits formally in 
public service design and planning requires extensive trust or even some level of desperation of 
the government sector. Empirical research also found that governments are reluctant to involve 
nonprofits in governance since it means giving up control to nonprofits (Tsukamoto & 
Nishimura, 2006). Most local government-nonprofit relationships are still dominated and 
controlled by governments (Gazley, 2008). Through the lens of resource dependence theory, this 
typical power imbalance between governments and nonprofits are mainly caused by resource 
dependence relationships (Malatesta & Smith, 2014). When nonprofits depend on governments 
for funding to sustain themselves and deliver services, scholars found that nonprofits tend to 
reduce their efforts in advocacy and political activities (Guo & Saxton, 2010). Similar logic can 
be applied to public service planning and design. When governments suffer from fiscal distress 
and rely on non-governmental revenue sources, especially for functional departments that are in 
a relatively low position in local government budgetary priorities, it is more likely for them to 
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open the platform for co-governance with nonprofit organizations. I use the “proportion public 
spending in a public service arena” to indicate the relative government capacity in fulfilling such 
functions on their own.    
Hypothesis 1-4: The likelihood of a nonprofit’s involvement in public service planning and 
design is negatively correlated with the local governments’ capacity in providing corresponding 
public services.  
 
In addition to factors at the community level, nonprofits’ involvement in public service planning 
and design is also likely to be determined by the organization’s capacity to conduct those 
activities. I propose three major indicators of an organization’s capacity for supporting public 
services: organizational size, organizational age, and the proportion of donative income. 
 
Organizational Size 
Organizational size is an important predictor of the scope of activities an organization is engaged 
in because organizations with more financial and human resources are more capable of 
supporting multiple types of coproduction activities, thus more likely to be engaged in service 
planning and design activities. Foster and Meinhard (2002) found that smaller organizations 
were less likely to form formal collaborative relationships with other organizations. In the field 
of nonprofit advocacy, evidence also consistently shows that an organization’s size is positively 
correlated with the scope and intensity of its advocacy activities (Guo & Zhang 2014; Mosley, 
2010; Child & Grønbjerg, 2007). I use an organization’s annual total expenditure to indicate the 
size of the organization in this paper. 
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Hypothesis 1-5: The likelihood of a nonprofit’s involvement in public service planning and 
design is positively correlated with the size of the organization. 
 
Organizational Age 
Organizational age is another factor in influencing a nonprofit organization’s decision in 
engaging in the co-governance of public services. Older organizations usually have more 
resources and legitimacy to conduct other types of activities. They are also better aware of the 
costs and risks of engaging in multiple activities (Minkoff, 2002). Scholars have also shown that 
public managers’ prior experiences of working with nonprofit organizations can increase their 
perception of partnership success (Gazley, 2010). Such success would reduce the transaction 
costs of collaboration and motivate both public and nonprofit managers to get engaged in more 
complex collaborative activities (Graddy & Chen, 2006), such as the planning and design of 
public services. Since nonprofits that are older are more likely to have a long working 
relationship with local governments, I hypothesize that older nonprofits are more likely to be 
engaged in the design and planning of public services. 
Hypothesis 1-6: The likelihood of a nonprofit’s involvement in public service planning and 
design is positively correlated with the age of the organization. 
 
Proportion of Donative Revenue  
The proportion of donative revenue is another factor that may shape an organization’s decision to 
participate in different types of coproduction activities. Weisbrod (2000) suggested that sources 
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of financial support for nonprofits are an important predictor of the behaviors of nonprofit 
organizations. Based on this intuition, Young (2007) developed a benefits theory of nonprofit 
finance, arguing that “sources of income should correspond with the nature of benefits conferred 
on, or of interest to, the providers of those resources” (p.341). According to the benefits theory, 
nonprofits with more private services rely more on earned program revenues, and nonprofits with 
more public services rely more on donations (Fischer, Wilsker, & Young, 2011). Using detailed 
revenue and expenditure data from eighty-seven Jewish Community Centers, Wilsker and Young 
(2010) have shown a significant correlation between revenue sources and the types of services 
nonprofits provide. Specifically, “expenditures on services of a more private goods nature are 
associated with greater reliance on earned income while expenditures on services of a more 
public goods nature are associated with greater reliance on charitable sources.” (p.194) For 
public service design and planning, it is more likely to be a public good because of its diffused 
benefits to the whole community. In addition, relying more on charitable sources may increase 
the legitimacy of nonprofit organizations, thus making the public put more trust on nonprofit 
organizations for them to participate in the planning and design of public services.  
Hypothesis 1-7: The likelihood of a nonprofit’s involvement in public service planning and 
design is positively correlated with its proportion of donative income.  
 
In summary, by reviewing the literature about community philanthropy and coproduction, the 
paper develops a framework and generates seven testable hypotheses about nonprofits’ 
involvement in the co-governance of public services, both at the community and the 
organizational level. These complex relationships are tested in the case of nonprofit support for 
parks and recreation services in large U.S. cities. In the following sections, the context of this 
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research, data and methodology, and the findings and implications of this research are presented 
in order.  
 
Context: Nonprofit Support for Parks and Recreation Services 
This paper is situated in the context of local parks and recreation services where nonprofits are 
documented to actively collaborate with local governments to provide these important public 
services (Cheng, 2016; Pincetl, 2003). Because of the trend of rapid urbanization (United 
Nations, 2014), urban parks and open green spaces are of great strategic importance for the 
quality of life for citizens who live in urban areas. They provide multiple environmental and 
social benefits to the community such as protecting drinking water, managing stormwater, 
cleaning the air, facilitating healthy lifestyles, reducing stress, and community regeneration 
(Crompton, 2008). Despite all these benefits city parks provide to citizens, parks and recreation 
services are still viewed by elected officials or city managers as nonessential or relatively 
discretionary, therefore prone to budget cuts (Skidmore & Scrsone, 2011). Because of such 
constraints facing the parks departments, nonprofits or citizen groups are documented to play a 
very important role in financing and supporting parks and recreation services (Harnik & Martin, 
2015; Walls, 2014). 
 
Nonprofits can and are documented to be involved in different phases of parks and recreation 
services. They can help parks departments raise money, organize volunteers, conserve natural 
resources, run facilities, or provide educational or recreational programs (Gazley, Cheng, & 
LaFontant, 2015). To guide all these efforts, a master plan is needed to serve as a blueprint and 
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visionary document for the park development. With a master plan, park managers can make 
conscientious decisions about the construction and improvement of parks, especially when 
certain opportunities or conflicts arise. Coupled with multiple benefits of park master plans, the 
development of such plans is a very time-assuming and costly process, with one master plan 
easily costing more than $ 200,000 (Harnik & Martin, 2015). It also requires extensive inputs 
from citizens and experts. Although far less prevalent compared other park-supporting activities, 
scholars have documented a rise in the involvement of nonprofit organizations in park planning 
and provision (Pincetl, 2003). It is an important question to ask why some nonprofits step further 
to get involved park planning activities, and its potential consequences for the quality of parks 
and recreation services.  
 
Data and Method 
I explore the determinants of nonprofits’ participation in the co-governance of public services 
through a multilevel logistic regression analysis of multiple data sources. Data for this study 
come from the U.S. Census, the National Center for Charitable Statistics, the Fiscally 
Standardized Cities (FiSC) database, and content analysis of selected organizations’ websites and 
990 forms. Park-supporting charities are identified through a joint procedure of keyword search 
of the 2013 National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) Core PC Files and following the 
National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities (NTEE) codes. One limitation of using the NCCS dataset 
is that it is more likely to capture charities that are more formalized and larger (more than 
$50,000 in annual revenues). Due to the constraints of government finance data, the search was 
limited to the 150 largest U.S. cities. Organizations in the final sample for statistical analysis 
meet two criteria: 1) the nonprofit is set up with the main purpose of supporting local public 
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park(s); 2) the nonprofit should at least have an active website to provide information for activity 
coding. After implementing a sequence of such strategies, the final analysis includes 204 park-
supporting nonprofits in 75 large U.S. cities.  
 
Variables and Data 
The dependent variable of this study, Park Planning, is a dummy variable that measures whether 
a park-supporting nonprofit organization has been involved in developing the master plan for a 
public park. This variable is constructed by content analysis of the websites and 990 forms of 
selected organizations. The variable was coded as 1 if their websites specifically mentioned their 
involvement in developing the master plan for a park. To draw comparisons with other 
supporting activities these nonprofits are engaged in, the author also included other types of park 
supporting activities in the coding protocol. These additional supporting categories include park 
management, advocacy, fundraising, natural resource conservation and maintenance, volunteer 
recruitment, education and outreach, offering recreational programs, construction of facilities, 
and member-serving activities.  
 
Several independent variables are constructed by following the major components of the 
proposed theoretical framework. Data about community characteristics come from the 2010 U.S. 
Census and data about public finance come from the 2012 Fiscally Standardized Cities (FiSC) 
database. One advantage of the FiSC database is that it captures public spending on parks and 
recreation services from overlapping jurisdictions, such as city governments, county 
governments, and special park districts, thus making the data comparable to large U.S. cities 
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(Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2017). All information at the organizational level comes from 
the 2013 NCCS Core PC Files. 
 
Modifying the racial homogeneity measurement proposed by Paarlberg and Gen (2009), 
community’s social diversity is measured by the following formula, using the proportion of 
different racial groups in the community:  
Social Diversity = 1 - ∑ (ni/N)2 
ni is the population of racial group i in the community. N is the total population of the 
community. Six racial groups are captured in the dataset, which includes white, black or African 
American, American Indian and Alaska Native, Asian, Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific 
Islander, and others. The social diversity index ranges from 0 to 1, where 0 represent perfect 
racial homogeneity (only one race in the community).   
 
Community’s financial and human resources are measured as the log of median household 
income, the log of median housing value, and the percentage of residents with a college degree 
or above in the selected county. Since these three variables are highly correlated (>0.7), a 
community resource index is created using factor analysis with these three variables. The 
retained principal factor has an eigenvalue of 2.494, and captures more than 90% of the 
variations of these three variables. Community stability is measured as the homeownership rate 
in the community. The proportion of public spending on parks is calculated by local 
government’s spending on parks and recreation services as a percentage of its total expenditures. 
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The percentage of residents voted for the Democratic candidate in the most recent presidential 
election is included as a control variable for the political ideology of the community.  
 
At the organizational level, organizational size is measured as the log of total expenditures of the 
organization. The age of the organization is operationalized by subtracting its reported ruling 
year (the year an organization’s 501(c)(3) status was granted by the IRS) from the baseline year. 
Although organizations can operate as unregistered charities prior to IRS recognition, the effect 
should not add more bias. Finally, the proportion of donative income is calculated by dividing 
the organization’s total annual income over its total public contributions.  
 
Multicollinearity among above independent variables was tested by calculating the variance 
inflation factor (VIF) for a linear regression model. Results suggest that multicollinearity is of 
limited concern for independent variables included in the final model. Table 1-1 and Table 1-2 
present the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of all the dependent and independent 
variables. From the descriptive statistics, we can see that most park-supporting nonprofits 
heavily rely on donative income, with a mean of 80% of the total revenue. Local governments 
spend less than 3% of their total budget on parks and recreation services. Before running the 
multivariate analysis, all independent variables are standardized, subtracting the average and 
dividing by the standard deviation, to facilitate comparability of the relative importance of 
predictor variables.  
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Table 1-1: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables 
Variables Observations Mean  SD  Min. Max.  
 
Organizational Level  
Park Planning  204 0.270  0.445 0 1 
Log Total Expenditure 204 12.247  2.460 0 17.628 
Organizational Age 204 19.417  11.20 2 63 
Percentage Donative Revenue 204 80.061  28.269 0 100 
 
City/County Level 
Percentage Park Spending of City Budget 204 2.890  1.721 0.169 8.231 
Social Diversity Index 204 0.199  0.172 0.030 0.609 
Community Resource Index 204 0  1 -1.917 2.021 
 
Homeownership Rate 204 50.464  13.256 20.8 74.2 
Percentage Votes to Democratic 
Candidate 
204 69.243  14.138 0 89.3 
 
Note: log median housing value, log median household income, and percentage residents with a 
college degree or above are used to create a community resource index that is finally included in 
the multilevel analysis.   
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Table 1-2: Correlation Matrix 
Variables 1 2 3  4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Park Planning  1.00         
2. Log Total Expenditure 0.11 1.00        
3. Organizational Age -0.16 0.24 1.00       
4. Percentage Donative 
Revenue 
0.16 0.15 -0.03 1.00      
5. Percentage Park 
Spending of City Budget 
-0.12 -0.04 0.04 -0.07 1.00     
6. Social Diversity Index 0.04 0.03 0.07 -0.05 0.36 1.00    
7. Community Resource 
Index 
-0.03 0.10 0.13 -0.03 -0.11 -0.27 1.00   
8. Homeownership Rate 0.14 -0.13 -0.11 0.05 0.23 0.22 -0.62 1.00  
9. Percentage Votes to 
Democratic Candidate 
-0.11 0.05 0.10 -0.03 -0.10 -0.11 0.40 -0.67 1.00 
 
 
Statistical Analysis 
Exploratory factor analysis is conducted for all supporting activities of park-supporting 
nonprofits to see whether there are certain patterns in the data that suggest co-governance, or 
park planning and design, is a distinct type of nonprofit support for public services. Since all 
types of park supporting activities are dummy coded, the estimates of the tetrachoric correlation 
coefficients of the binary variables are first calculated. The pairwise correlation matrix is then 
used to perform the standard factor analysis (StataCorp, 2013).   
 
A multilevel logistic regression is conducted to test the theoretical framework of the 
determinants of nonprofit co-governance of public services. This statistical method is used to 
take care of the nested structure of the data and the nature of the dependent variable: park-
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supporting nonprofits are nested in cities and the dependent variable for the model in binary. 
When the dependent variable is binary, therefore not following a normal distribution, the regular 
ordinary least squares regression may generate biased estimates. Because the data is nested in 
hierarchical structures, observations in the dataset are no longer independent from each other. 
Multilevel logistic regression is in place to take care of the above limitations and generate 
unbiased estimates. Robust standard errors are used in the model to deal with the 
heteroskedasticity of residuals.  
 
Empirical Findings and Results 
Table 1-3 presents the count of different types of supporting activities conducted by those park-
supporting nonprofits. According to Table 1-3, most park-supporting nonprofits get involved in 
providing financial or volunteer assistance to the maintenance and operation of parks. However, 
relatively few have engaged in park planning and advocacy activities. This finding corresponds 
to previous empirical evidence that co-governance is yet to become a major type of nonprofit 
support for public services (Tsukamoto & Nishimura, 2006). Out of these supporting activities 
that do show some prevalence (at least 10%), nonprofits serving as the manager of parks 
generate the lowest frequency (12.74%). In other words, although park-supporting nonprofits are 
actively involved in different aspects of park management and maintenance, it is still very 
unlikely for local governments to delegate full park management responsibilities to nonprofits. 
This may be an emerging phenomenon worthy of further exploration.   
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Table 1-3: Supporting Activities of City Park-supporting Nonprofits 
Category 
Number of 
Supporting Activities 
(Frequency) 
N = 204 
1. Participating in developing the master plan for the park 56 (26.96%) 
2. Managing the daily operation of the park 26 (12.74%) 
3. Advocating for park funding and park policy 44 (21.57%) 
4. Fundraising – e.g., raising philanthropic funds for the 
benefit of a public park. 
198 (97.05%) 
5. Natural resource maintenance and construction – 
e.g., volunteer day for trail construction 
145 (71.08%) 
6. Volunteer recruitment and management – e.g., NPO 
provides an internet portal for volunteer recruitment 
152 (74.51%) 
7. Public education and outreach—e.g., volunteer led 
nature education. 
121 (59.31%) 
8. Offers recreation programs – e.g., organizing a sports 
league, concerts or other cultural events. 
99 (48.53%) 
9. Erection or Construction of Facilities 118 (57.84%) 
10. Membership organization 83 (40.69%) 
 
Note: Park-supporting nonprofits can conduct activities listed in the table simultaneously. 
Therefore, the total frequency adds up to be much large 100%. Only activities with more than 10% 
frequency are reported here to represent the major types of supporting activities of these 
nonprofits. The activity coding follows a grounded theory approach proposal by Gazley, et al 
(2015). Some of the dropped activities include consulting, grant-making, serving as funding 
intermediaries, and conducting research. 
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The result of the exploratory factor analysis is presented in Table 1-4. Activities that are bolded 
in a column indicates that the underlying factor captures most of the variance of the activity. 
According to Table 1-4, park-supporting activities conducted by these nonprofits can be 
explained by three underlying factors (eigenvalues larger than 1). Park planning loads 
predominantly on a distinct factor of its own. Park management and recreational programming 
have a strong correlation: when nonprofits take the role of managing a park, they are more likely 
to offer recreational programs at the same time. Advocacy, fundraising, natural resource 
maintenance, volunteer recruitment, education & outreach, facility construction, and membership 
organizations load on another distinct underlying factor. There is a distinct pattern of co-
governance - park planning - presented in those park-supporting activities.  
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Table 1-4: Exploratory Factor Analysis of Services by Charities Supporting Federal Parks 
 Factor 1    Factor 2 Factor 3 
Park Planning 1.9652 0.0373 0.0384  
Park Management 0.2797 -0.0067 0.8486 
Advocacy 0.0516 0.3480 -0.2680 
Natural Resource Maintenance 0.1681 0.8164 0.0828 
Volunteer Recruitment 0.1649 0.7531 0.0439 
Education & Outreach 0.0718 0.5875 0.1829  
Recreational Programming   0.0629 0.2272 0.7151 
Facility Construction 0.1472 0.3652 0.1483 
Member Serving 0.0230 0.4030 -0.1109 
 
Note: 1) Some coefficients are bolded for ease of interpretation.  
2) Fundraising is not included in the factor analysis for two reasons. First, almost all organizations are 
involved in fundraising and there are few variations in the data to contribute to the factor analysis. Second, 
it is hard to tell whether the fundraising activity is for the support of nonprofit organizations themselves 
or projects in parks.  
 
Most other activities concentrate on the implementation of public services, which could fall 
under either the co-management or the co-production model. According to Brandsen and 
Pestoff’s (2006) conceptualization, co-management mainly focuses on interactions at the 
organizational level while coproduction on the voluntary efforts of citizens (p.497). The results 
of the factor analysis seem to point out something beyond this citizen vs. organization distinction, 
since these can be organizational level and citizen level activities for both underlying factors. For 
example, both offering educational programs and offering recreation programs can be 
organizational level activities. The key difference between the two seems to be the nature of the 
benefits. When nonprofits manage a public park, they are more likely to offer recreational 
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programs, which mainly offer individual level benefits. Recreational programs are also an 
important source of revenue for running the parks. For other supporting activities that load on 
another factor, such as natural resource maintenance and fundraising, the corresponding benefits 
are diffused to other park users and the community, thus falling under the category of collective 
coproduction (Brudney & England, 1983).   
 
The results of the multilevel analysis are presented in Table 1-5. The model fit indexes indicate 
that utilizing the multilevel logistic regression presents a statistically significant model 
improvement compared with a normal logistic regression model. The intraclass correlation 
coefficient (ICC) is 0.122, suggesting that 12.2% variations of the data can be solely explained 
by the correlations caused by the hierarchical structure of the data (Snijders & Bosker, 2012). 
Both the raw coefficients and factor change in odds are reported for each independent variable to 
facilitate interpretations. The dependent variable is whether a nonprofit is involved in developing 
the master plan for the park(s). In the following paragraphs, I will run through each hypothesis to 
examine whether it is supported or not supported by the results of this multilevel analysis.    
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Table 1-5: Multilevel Logistic Regression Results 
DV: Park Planning Raw 
Coefficients 
Factor Change 
in Odds 
 
Organizational Capacity 
  
Organizational Size 0.436* 
(0.231) 
1.547 
Organizational Age -0.474*** 
(0.160) 
0.623 
Proportion Donative Revenue 0.367 
(0.251) 
1.443 
 
Community Capacity 
  
Percentage Park Spending of City Budget -0.487** 
(0.241) 
0.614 
Social Diversity Index 0.257* 
(0.149) 
1.293 
Community Stability 0.653*** 
(0.214) 
1.921 
Community Resource Index 0.390** 
(0.160) 
1.477 
Percentage Votes to Democratic Candidate 0.013 
(0.280) 
1.013 
Constant -1.188*** 
(0.167) 
 
Number of Observations 
Number of Groups 
Intraclass Correlation 
204 
75 
12.20% 
 
Note: DV = dependent variable. DLR test vs. logistic model: chi2(0) = 0.00. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. Significance Level: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
The hypotheses about community’s financial and human resources, community stability, and 
social diversity are supported by the analysis, although the coefficient for the social diversity 
variable is only marginally significant (p = 0.083). There is no statistically significant 
relationship between nonprofits’ involvement in co-governance and the political ideology of the 
community. Compared with other coefficients, community stability, which is measured as 
homeownership rate, presents the strongest influence on nonprofits’ involvement in co-
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governance. A standard deviation increase in the homeownership of the community increases the 
odds of nonprofits’ involvement in co-governance by a factor of 1.921. Community’s financial 
and human resources and the social diversity of the community have an impact of 1.477 and 
1.294 respectively. Above results indicate that nonprofits are more likely to be involved in co-
governance when the community is stable, resourceful, and has more heterogeneous demands for 
public services.    
 
Hypothesis 1-4 predicts that nonprofits are more likely to be involved in co-governance when 
local governments have a relatively weaker capacity in providing corresponding public services, 
measured as the percentage of public spending on parks and recreation services. The regression 
result supports this hypothesis. A standard deviation increase in the percentage parks spending of 
city budget decreases the odds of nonprofits’ involvement in co-governance by a factor 0.614. 
This finding suggests that local governments are more likely invite nonprofits to the co-
governance regime when they suffer from resource and capacity constraints. It also suggests that 
the interdependence patterns consistently found in social services or the contracting out regime 
(Salamon, 1987; Lecy & Van Slyke, 2013), where nonprofits serve as an alternative mechanism 
for public service delivery, may not be applicable to the setting where nonprofits are involved in 
the planning and formulation of public services or policies.     
 
In terms of the impact of organizational capacity, the hypothesis about organizational size is 
marginally supported by the analysis (p = 0.059).  There is no statistically significant relationship 
between nonprofits’ involvement in co-governance and their reliance on donative income. This 
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result may be driven by the fact that most nonprofits in the dataset rely heavily on donative 
income (mean = 80%). A standard deviation increase in the total organizational expenditure 
increases the odds of nonprofits’ involvement in co-governance by a factor of 1.547. Larger 
nonprofits are more likely to be involved in public service planning and design.  
 
The hypothesis about organizational age is not supported by the regression result. Contrary to the 
prediction of the theoretical model, older organizations are less likely to get involved in co-
governance. A standard deviation increase in the age of the organization decreases the odds of 
nonprofits’ involvement in co-governance by a factor of 0.623. This result suggests a level of 
“structural inertia” of nonprofit support for public services in the sense that when nonprofits are 
stable in the co-productive relationship with local governments, it is difficult for them to move 
beyond existing patterns of interactions to get involved in co-governance. It also suggests 
nonprofits’ involvement in co-governance is a new phenomenon of public service provision: 
younger and larger nonprofit organizations push the boundaries of the status quo, moving 
nonprofit support for public services beyond co-production to co-governance.  
 
Conclusion 
This study seeks to build an understanding of nonprofit support for public services through the 
lens of co-production and co-governance. By a content analysis of 204 park-supporting 
nonprofits’ websites and developing a theoretical framework for nonprofits’ involvement in the 
co-governance of public services, this paper empirically investigates whether co-governance is a 
distinct type of nonprofit support for public services, and under what circumstances nonprofits 
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are more likely to be involved in the planning and design of public services. The findings of 
exploratory factor analysis suggest that co-governance, although not as prevalent, is indeed a 
distinct type of nonprofit support for public services. The multilevel logistic regression analysis 
suggests that nonprofits are more likely to get involved in co-governance when they are larger 
and younger, and operate in communities which are resourceful, stable, socially diverse, and has 
weak government capacity in providing corresponding public services. The proportion of 
donative income is not a determinant of nonprofits’ involvement in co-governance. Finally, this 
paper suggests that co-governance of nonprofits in public service provision is a new form of 
nonprofit support for public services and requires further theory development and testing.  
 
One limitation of this study is the accuracy of determining whether a nonprofit involves in 
developing the master plan for a park based on the content analysis of its website. I fully 
recognize the possibility and potential bias of missing organizations that get involved in the 
planning of parks but have failed in reporting it on their websites. However, since the master 
plan not only plays a significant role in park development, but is instrumental for park-
supporting nonprofits to raise money for parks (Harnik & Martin, 2015), it is unlikely that park-
supporting nonprofits engage in but do not report this important activity on their websites. 
Another limitation is that this study only focuses on larger nonprofit organizations that operate in 
large U.S. cities. Data constraints mainly cause this limitation: the NCCS dataset only tracks 
nonprofits that reach a certain annual revenue threshold, and FiSC database only provides 
government finance data for the largest 150 U.S. cities. Cautions need to be taken when 
generalizing the findings of this study to park-supporting groups that are small, informal, or 
operate in less populous communities.  
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Future research should be conducted in other public service subsectors to see whether this 
theoretical framework holds. Even for parks and recreation services, which has witnessed an 
emerging trend of local governments relying on nonprofits for funding and programs, nonprofits’ 
involvement in co-governance is not as prevalent compared with other types of public service 
supporting activities. Scholars should pay close attention to this trend of nonprofits moving 
upward in the phases of public service provision as governments at all levels suffer from 
extensive fiscal stress. Nonprofits’ involvement in the co-governance of public services is also 
likely to have different meanings for different public service subsectors, such as public education, 
public libraries, museums and art centers. 
 
Another extension of this research is about the distributional, performance, and democratic 
consequences of co-governance. Findings from this research suggest that co-governance is more 
likely to take place when participating nonprofits are larger, younger, and operate in more 
resourceful communities. However, what are the consequences of nonprofits’ involvement in co-
governance? Is this a process of mobilizing genuine citizen participation or just inviting another 
special interest group to the table? Are disadvantaged groups in the community better or worse 
off as a result of co-governance? Does co-governance result in better public service outcomes? 
These questions have huge implications about how public services should be planned, designed, 
and implemented. Both quantitative and qualitative approaches will be needed to answer these 
important questions. 
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Fundamentally, this study suggests that co-governance is a distinct type of nonprofit support for 
public services and we need to develop a better understanding of its processes and outcomes. It is 
important to bridge the distinction of production and provision in public services, and pay close 
attention to the role of nonprofit organizations in both phases. The process of nonprofits moving 
from the co-production phrase to the co-governance phase seems not to be an automatic process. 
It requires the demand of local governments and citizens, and extensive resource inputs from 
both the community and nonprofit organizations themselves. The theoretical and policy 
implications of this study is huge as public management scholarship moves from new public 
management to new public governance, and public managers are facing extensive challenges in 
sustaining the desired level of public services and solving complex social problems on their own.  
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CHAPTER 2 
NONPROFIT SPENDING AND GOVERNMENT PROVISION OF PUBLIC SERVICES: 
TESTING THEORIES OF GOVERNMENT-NONPROFIT RELATIONSHIPS 
 
Abstract: 
Empirical studies and theories of government-nonprofit relationships have assumed a 
unidirectional funding flow from governments to nonprofits and therefore focusing on the impact 
of governments on nonprofits. By bringing in the critical mass theory and utilizing a unique 
panel dataset that contains nonprofit and city government spending on parks, this article 
examines several prominent theoretical models of government-nonprofit relationships to answer 
the question of how expenditures of park-supporting charities influence public spending on parks 
and recreation services. The findings suggest that nonprofit spending on parks in a city has a 
non-linear decreasing effect on public spending on parks, which supports the market niche 
model. In addition, this relationship is mainly driven by local governments’ non-capital 
expenditures on parks. Finally, this paper suggests that government-nonprofit relationships are 
not identical when the direction of funding flow differs in subsectors. The critical mass theory 
and non-linear models are promising ways of disentangling complex relationships between 
nonprofits and governments. 
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Introduction 
In the last twenty years, we have witnessed a paradigm shift in public management from the 
hierarchical authority paradigm of bureaucratic management to collaborative and networked 
management (Agranoff & McGuire; 2001; Salamon, 2002; Kettl, 2006; O’Toole, 1997). 
Milward and Provan (1993, p.222) used the somewhat frightening phrase “hollow state” to 
signify the changing landscape in public services where “command and control” is no longer the 
dominant governance mechanism. Contracting out and third-sector service providers are 
dominant in public service delivery.  
 
Scholars outside the U.S. have also discovered this new public management reality. Rhodes 
(1996) characterized this new governance era as “governing without government” in the UK. 
Osborne and Gaebler’s (1992) influential book Reinventing Government suggested a new model 
of public management that uses market forces to foster competition in service delivery and thus 
making the public sector more productive. Cross-sectoral interactions and the value of 
collaboration are increasingly recognized as not only a reality but also a necessary condition for 
addressing some of the society’s most challenging problems (McGuire, 2006; Bryson et al., 
2006). Smith and Lipsky (1993) used Nonprofits for Hire to describe the particular prevalence of 
nonprofit providers in public services. 
  
Despite the surge of scholarly interest in collaborative management and nonprofit government 
relationships in the past two decades (Gazley & Guo, 2015), the substantive focus of the 
literature tends to be predominantly focused on social service industries and the contracting 
regime. Moreover, a unidirectional direction of funding flow from government to nonprofit 
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organizations is assumed. Because of this assumption, theory building in government-nonprofit 
relationships is largely biased toward the distinction between provision and production. 
Nonprofit and for-profit providers are regarded as an alternative arrangement of public service 
production while public service provision is still assumed to be decided and financed by 
government agencies (McGinnis,1999). Existing literature on government-nonprofit 
collaboration also tends to focus more on the influence of government funding on nonprofit 
finances and activities (Gazley & Brudney, 2007; Guo, 2007; Brooks, 2000).  
 
Reversing this assumption, it may be possible for nonprofits to both fund and influence 
government services. Empirical evidence also supports this academic conjecture. Nelson and 
Gazley (2014) have documented a rapid growth of school-supporting charities, which are set up 
to raise money and provide programs for public schools. Gazley, Cheng, and LaFontant (2016) 
presented a non-linear increase in the rate of creation of public park-supporting charities at the 
state and federal levels, suggesting that the creation rate is a function of government fiscal stress. 
Yandle, Noonan, and Gazley (2016) used Ostrom’s social-ecological systems (SES) framework 
to study philanthropic support for national parks through “friends of parks” charities and 
cooperating associations. Follman, Cseh, and Brudney (2016) also found a significant growth of 
volunteer programs that are co-managed by the National Park Service and its nonprofit partners.  
 
This emerging phenomenon of government relying on philanthropy and nonprofits to fund public 
services has only been partially explored by public management scholars. As governments at all 
levels suffer from extensive budget cuts and financial crisis, it is a timely policy and 
management question to ask about the consequences of those nonprofit organizations that are up 
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to mainly fund and support services that are traditionally provided and managed by government 
agencies. It is also a theoretically interesting question to investigate the possible mechanisms and 
consequences of nonprofits organizations influencing governments through funding public 
services, in addition to the mechanism of service delivery and advocacy that are familiar to and 
recognized by public management scholars (Fyall, 2016).  
 
Situated in the context of local parks and recreation services in the 149 largest U.S. cities, this 
article investigates whether expenditures of park-supporting charities influence the level of 
public spending on corresponding public services. This article tests three important social 
science theories – the market niche model, the interdependence model, and the critical mass 
model –, in their ability to explain these government-nonprofit relationships. This article makes 
several theoretical and methodological contributions to the literature on government-nonprofit 
relationships. First, this article tests the assumption of a unidirectional funding flow from 
governments to nonprofit organizations ((Lecy & Van Slyke, 2013; Grønbjerg & Paarlberg, 
2001), which implies that government funding would impact the behavior of nonprofit 
organizations instead of the other way around. This article argues that a two-way understanding 
is essential for the theory building and development in government-nonprofit relationships. 
Second, by relaxing the linearity assumption employed by previous studies, this article 
incorporates the theory of critical mass and builds a nonlinear model to generate a more nuanced 
understanding of cross-sector government-nonprofit funding interactions. The findings 
contribute to the existing literature of government-nonprofit relationships and inform current 
policy and management discussions of alternative ways of financing public services.  
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Context and Background 
This research takes place within the context of local parks and recreation services in the U.S, 
focused on the increasing reliance by cities on nonprofit organizations for park financing and 
management. The policy area of local parks and recreation services provides a particularly rich 
setting for studying nonprofit government interactions when there is a reverse funding flow from 
nonprofits to governments. As Ostrom (1990, p.26) has pointed out in the analogy between 
biology and studying complex social processes, “Their (biologists) scientific strategy frequently 
has involved identifying for empirical observation the simplest possible organism in which a 
process occurs in a clarified, or even exaggerated, form…The organism is not chosen because it 
is representative of all organisms. Rather, the organism is chosen because particular processes 
can be studied more effectively”. Similarly, local parks and recreation services are chosen 
because the influence of philanthropy on governments in this policy area tends to be exaggerated 
compared with other policy areas. Parks and recreation services are regarded as a local public 
good in the sense that they provide multiple social and environmental benefits to the whole 
community, therefore typically provided and managed by local governments (Walls, 2014). 
However, because of its relatively low priority in local government spending, parks departments 
are constantly pushed to find partners and alternative funding sources (Skidmore & Scorsone, 
2011; Kaczynski & Crompton, 2006).  
 
On the other hand, nonprofit organizations have become instrumental in financing and managing 
local parks and recreation services. By studying the 41 most prominent park conservancies in the 
U.S., Harnik and Martin (2005, p.9) found that “on a per acre basis, conservancies spent an 
average of $14,400, about 50 percent more than public park departments”. Those park-
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supporting charities are also growing very rapidly (Harnik & Martin, 2005). In a recent survey of 
local parks directors by Resources for the Future, Walls (2014) found that among the 44 local 
park directors who responded to the survey, only five reported that park foundations, friends’ 
organizations or park conservancies generated no money for their park systems. A total of $143 
million in private support toward park systems was documented in the survey. In addition, Walls 
(2014, p.12) found that most of those groups spent “their time and money on capital projects and 
park programs”. Local parks and recreation service are not only a policy area where significant 
reverse funding flow from nonprofits to governments takes place but the particular processes of 
nonprofits influencing the provision of public services can also be studied more effectively. As 
nonprofit organizations become an important source of support for funding local parks and 
recreation services, it is an important public policy and management question to investigate how 
expenditures of those nonprofits influence the level of public spending of corresponding public 
agencies.  
 
Theoretical Perspectives  
For the interaction between local governments and nonprofit organizations, there are mainly 
three theoretical frameworks in place that deal with how nonprofit organizations and 
philanthropy may influence local governments in the provision of public services. I will briefly 
review the three theoretical frameworks, identify the gaps in the literature, and draw some 
hypotheses for subsequent modeling and testing.  
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The Market Niche Model 
Smith and Grønbjerg (2006) used the market niche model to characterize a straight market model 
of government-nonprofit relationships. In this view, nonprofits arise to supply particular types of 
goods and services to occupying special niches in a mixed economy. In terms of government-
nonprofit relationships, theories of contract and government failure offer perhaps the most 
articulated understanding of the interaction between governments and nonprofit organizations. 
Government failure results from the constraints of the democratic system and policy making 
processes. Governments are not able to meet the demand of heterogeneous citizen preferences 
beyond the median voter or the dominant political coalition (Buchanan & Tullock, 1962). The 
existence of nonprofits could be the solution to the problem of heterogeneous citizen preferences 
(high demanders) for collective and public goods (Weisbrod, 1975).  
 
Salamon (1987) turned the process around and offered the conceptualization of “voluntary 
failure.” Rather than assuming nonprofits are able to step in when other sectors fail, Salamon 
recognized the systematic constraints of nonprofits: philanthropic insufficiency, philanthropic 
particularism, philanthropic paternalism, and philanthropic amateurism. Philanthropic 
insufficiency refers to the possibility that nonprofits have limited resources due to the existence 
of the free-rider problem, thus failing to provide adequate collective goods. Philanthropic 
particularism refers to the tendency of certain nonprofits to focus their programs on specific 
constituent groups (e.g., certain ethnicities or religions) while leaving other groups unserved. 
Philanthropic paternalism means that donors of the organization control charitable resources and 
may determine the goal and activities of the organization. However, the consumers of the service 
may not be able to make decisions about what services to receive. The final type of voluntary 
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failure, philanthropic amateurism, refers to the human resource constraints of nonprofits: 
Nonprofits often rely on volunteers for service provision and their volunteers may lack necessary 
professional training compared with their government or business counterparts.  
 
From the perspective of the government and voluntary failures theories, the role of nonprofits is 
to provide those necessary services to meet the heterogeneous demands of local citizens which 
governments may not be able to provide due to median voter constraints. Governments may also 
respond to philanthropic insufficiency if nonprofits do not have enough resources to provide 
corresponding public services. Therefore, based on government failure and voluntary failure 
theories, when nonprofits are more important in providing the services, governments may reduce 
their funding in areas of similar services that nonprofits provide, especially when nonprofits 
primarily depend on private donations to provide the services. Young (2000) characterized this 
type of government-nonprofit relationship as the supplementary relationship. In this view of 
nonprofits as a supplement, “private financing of public goods provision can be regarded to have 
an inverse relationship with government expenditures” (Young 2000, p.150). Based on the 
market niche model, the following hypothesis can be drawn:  
 
Hypothesis 2-1: Everything else being equal, expenditures of park-supporting charities are 
negatively associated with the level of local government spending on parks and recreation 
services.  
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The Interdependence Model 
Rather than competing to provide particular types of services, the interdependence model focuses 
on the ability of nonprofits to engage in a direct exchange relationship with governments. The 
basic elements of the interdependence model are articulated by Salamon (1987) to deal with the 
resource exchange between nonprofits and government agencies to make up each other’s 
weakness. This perspective emphasizes the fact that governments give financial resources and 
grants to nonprofits for service delivery, which drives the growth of the nonprofit sector 
(Grønbjerg 1993). At the same time, the existence of nonprofits may also drive the spending of 
governments in corresponding service areas. Wolpert (1977) raised the idea that in the long run, 
low demanders, who prefer less public spending on certain public services, may migrate to a 
community that has a lower provision level of the collective goods, thus driving up the average 
preference for the collective good in their home community. “At some points, the difference 
between the preferences of the median voter and the preference of the high demanders may 
shrink sufficiently that the nonprofit organization's shifts from donative finance to government 
provision-of-service contracts.” (Steinberg, 2006, p.123) In other words, governments may over 
time find themselves aligned with the agenda of those nonprofits that have public goals and 
priorities, thus being willing to delegate the production of those services to nonprofit 
organizations (Milward & Provan, 2000). Young (2000) characterized this model of government-
nonprofit relationship as the complementary model.  
 
Empirically, Lecy and Van Slyke (2013) have shown that human service nonprofits tend to have 
a higher community density when the government provides funding to nonprofits. Compared 
with the case of government failure, their finding supports the complementary view of the 
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government-nonprofit relationship. By surveying local governments and nonprofits in Georgia, 
Gazley and Brudney (2007) indicated that in government-nonprofit partnerships, both sides 
sought multiple goals, with local governments emphasizing more the goal of expertise and 
capacity while nonprofits are more likely to seek funding from the partnership. Paarlberg and 
Yoshioka (2016) also found that per capita local government revenues were positively related to 
the level of community philanthropy, which was measured as per capita giving to local United 
Way affiliates. There seems to be a pretty robust finding in social and human services that 
government spending is positively associated with the size of the nonprofit sector. However, this 
seemingly robust finding is worth being tested in other policy contexts (Lecy & Van Slyke, 
2013), especially when there is a significant reverse funding flow from nonprofits to 
governments. Based on the interdependence model, the following hypothesis can be drawn: 
 
Hypothesis 2-2: Everything else being equal, expenditures of park-supporting charities are 
positively associated with the level of local government spending on parks and recreation 
services.  
 
 
The Critical Mass Model 
In addition to the linear and classic understanding of nonprofit government interactions 
mentioned above, there are some other more nuanced ways of understanding the mechanisms for 
nonprofit policy influence. Using a grounded theory approach, Fyall (2016) identified several 
mechanisms by which nonprofits may actually influence public spending: public employees may 
rely on their nonprofit partners to influence elected officials for more spending in corresponding 
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service areas; nonprofits may serve as funding leverages for state and local governments to 
receive benefits from other government programs; nonprofits may form advocacy coalitions to 
increase the effectiveness of their advocacy. The underlying assumption of above mechanisms 
seems to be that the size of the nonprofits needs to reach a certain threshold to have enough 
impact.   
 
In classical social science theories, the critical mass theory is used to explain the emergence of 
successful collective actions: “some threshold of participants or action has to be crossed before a 
social movement ‘explodes’ into being” (Oliver, Marwell, & Teixeira 1985). In the literature of 
public management and representative bureaucracy, Meier (1993) suggested a critical mass of 
Latino teachers was needed to before they can actively represent the interest of a minority group. 
In the literature of social innovation and social entrepreneurship, the idea of collective impact 
was raised to illustrate the idea that systematic change will not take place unless all parts of the 
network work at the same time (Kania & Kramer, 2011).  
 
Although not frequently used in the literature of government-nonprofit relationships, a critical 
mass model may be useful to disentangle the complicated and dynamic relationship between 
governments and nonprofit organizations. Nonprofit organizations may have to reach a certain 
size and scale before certain influences on governments take place. Using 253 American 
symphony orchestras’ revenue portfolio information from 1984 to 1991, Brooks (2000, p.451) 
found a nonlinear relationship between government support and charitable giving: “at the low 
levels of subsidies, government support may stimulate private giving, whereas at high levels it 
could have just the opposite effect”. Young (2000) also suggested that private financing of 
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government services need to be understood both from supplementary and complementary 
perspectives.  Both crowding in and crowding out may work at the same time. However, at 
different point of the spectrum, their effect may be different. Based on the critical mass model, 
the following hypothesis can be drawn:  
 
Hypothesis 2-3: Everything else being equal, expenditures of park-supporting charities have a 
curvilinear relationship with the level of local government spending on parks and recreation 
services. In addition, there is a threshold effect of the impact of park-supporting charities’ 
expenditures on the level of local government spending on parks and recreation services.  
 
 
Data and Methodology 
Data Source and Sample 
This study draws on several primary data sources that span from government finance, nonprofit 
finance, to community characteristics. The primary government finance dataset contains 
information about local public spending on parks and other public finance information for the 
149 largest cities in the U.S. in the period from 1989 to 20121. Cities are identified through the 
Lincoln Institute’s Fiscally Standardized Cities (FiSCs) database, which includes more than 120 
categories of revenues, expenditures, debt, and assets information, for the 150 largest U.S. cities 
in the period from 1977 to 2012 period (Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2017). The major 
advantage of the FiSCs database is that it provides comparable public finance data for large U.S. 
cities. The provision and delivery of public services are organized in different ways in different 
                                                 
1 Washington, D.C. is excluded from the dataset because its jurisdictional level is not compatible with other cities 
and the public finance structure in Washington, D.C. is quite different from other U.S. cities. 
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cities. While some cities take the sole responsibilities of providing public services to their 
residents, others share the responsibilities with other overlapping jurisdictions, such as county 
governments and special districts. The FiSCs database accounts for those differences by “adding 
revenues and expenditures of each central city municipal government to a portion of the revenues 
and expenditures of overlying governments, including counties, independent school districts, and 
special districts” (Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2017). By using the FiSCs database, this 
study is able to both delineate specific government expenditures on parks and recreation services 
and take different structures of local governments into consideration. Although the 149 largest 
cities may not be a representative of all the local municipal governments in the U.S., the 
advantages of precision and comparability that the FiSCs dataset provides outweigh its 
disadvantage in representativeness. In addition, since park-supporting charities are still a 
relatively new phenomenon and the need for public greens spaces tends to be more significant in 
large cities, the focus on the largest cities may give us the freshest and most dynamic 
examination of this emerging phenomenon.    
 
Information on the finances of park-supporting charities is mainly accessed through and based on 
the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) 2013 Core Public Charity Files dataset. 
NCCS maintains the most comprehensive nonprofit financial data based on their annual returns 
of form 990. One limitation of the NCCS dataset is that it may miss public charities that do not 
meet the filing threshold of $50,000 in annual revenues. However, since this study mainly 
focuses on the “financial” impact of those park-supporting charities and charities that do not file 
form 990 tend to have a small budget size, the problem is less serious in this case. The NCCS 
dataset was first filtered to nonprofits that are located only in the 149 largest U.S. cities. Park-
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supporting charities were then identified in the NCCS database by using both keywords search 
and National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities (NTEE) codes. NTEE codes are developed by NCCS 
to characterize the major types of activities those public charities are involved in. However, 
relying solely on NTEE codes tend to be insufficient to capture all cases, and this is also true in 
the case of park-supporting charities2. To achieve both efficiency and comprehensiveness, a 
carefully designed three-step approach was used to identify those park-supporting charities3. 
Each identified park-supporting charity in the 2013 NCCS dataset was then linked to the 
historical NCCS Core PC File dataset from 1989 to 2012 to construct the complete panel dataset 
of park-supporting charities in the 149 largest U.S. cities. Expenditures of park-supporting 
charities were aggregated at the city level to represent cities’ total nonprofit expenditures on 
parks and recreation services in a given year.  
 
Geographic identifiers in the FiSCs dataset and NCCS dataset were used to merge with the 1990 
Decennial Census, the 2000 Decennial Census, the 2010 Decennial Census, the 2006-10 
American Community Survey (ACS), the Economic Census (1997, 2002, 2007), County-level 
Social Capital Dataset (1997, 2005, 2009), and the Voting and Elections Collection at the CQ 
Press (1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008). All the census datasets are accessed through U.S. Census 
                                                 
2 Through a random test of existing park friends’ organizations, the author found that NTEE codes do not provide 
the most comprehensive coverage of park-supporting charities. For example, Friends of the Garfield Park in 
Indianapolis is characterized as A (Arts, Culture & Humanities), instead of C (Environment) or N (Recreation & 
Sports).  
3 First, a different set of keywords search is used to identify potential park-supporting charities under the full NCCS 
database and under NTEE code C for Environment and NTEE code D for Recreation & Sports. Second, the database 
is complemented by looking through existing research or reports on city park-supporting charities (Walls, 2014; 
Harnick & Martin, 2015) to find additional cases of large city park conservancies. Third, a comprehensive 
examination based on organizations’ websites and form 990 was conducted to exclude any organization that does 
not have a major purpose of supporting local public parks or local public park systems at the city or county level 
(some land conservancies are supporting private land and some park conservancies are supporting state parks, 
national parks, or parks in other jurisdictions). Each eligible organization was further coded to identify whether it 
serves specific city park units or the whole city park system. The resulting search produced 267 city or county park-
supporting charities in the largest 149 U.S. cities, excluding Washington, D.C.   
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Bureau and measured at the county level. Since the Census does not provide yearly information 
for U.S. counties, existing data points in the dataset were used to linearly interpolate and 
extrapolate variables to fill in data for missing years. Finally, all variables measured in dollars 
are transformed to inflation-adjusted 2012 dollars. The final analysis sample includes the largest 
149 U.S. cities in the period from 1989 to 2012.  
 
Variables and Measurement 
The dependent variable – public spending on parks and recreation services – is measured as two 
broad categories and six specific forms. In terms of the absolute size of the expenditures, the log 
of total public direct spending on parks, the log of real public capital outlay spending on parks, 
and the log of real public non-capital spending on parks are specified as dependent variables. 
Regarding the proportion of the expenditures, the proportion of the above types of parks and 
recreation expenditures in their corresponding total government expenditures are specified as 
dependent variables. According to the Census, total direct expenditures are defined as all 
expenditures other than intergovernmental expenditures. Capital outlay is the direct expenditures 
for the construction of buildings, grounds, and other improvements, and the purchase of 
equipment, land, and existing structures (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2006). Non-capital 
expenditures are calculated by subtracting capital outlay expenditures from the total direct 
expenditures on parks and recreation services. The dependent variable is specified as those six 
forms to capture the differential impact nonprofit spending may have on public spending both in 
terms of absolute amount and relative proportion, thus strengthening the robustness of the 
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findings. The absolute size of public spending on parks is specified in logarithmic forms to better 
fit the normality assumption of the OLS regression4.   
 
Key independent variables. The key measure for the philanthropic support of parks and 
recreation service is the lagged total expenditures of park-supporting charities aggregated at the 
city level by year. Nonprofit expenditures are selected over nonprofit revenues since 
expenditures are expected to have a more direct impact on park-related projects and government 
operation. The square of nonprofit expenditures is also included in the model to capture the 
expected nonlinear relationships between public and nonprofit spending on parks, suggested by 
the critical mass model. The logarithmic form of nonprofit expenditures is not taken mainly for 
two reasons. First, there are a lot of zeros in the dataset for nonprofit expenditures, and the 
logarithmic form will generate a significant amount of missing cases, thus causing bias to the 
sample. Second, it is quite complicated to interpret the nonlinear impact when both the 
logarithmic form and its square term are included in the model5. Nonprofit expenditures are in 
units of millions of dollars. 
 
Control variables. Drawing on existing studies of the determinants of local governments’ 
expenditures, three types of control variables are included in the study to control for 
community’s general demographic characteristics, wealth and economic resources a community 
has, and the structure of government revenue. All control variables are lagged by one year to 
account for local governments’ budget cycle. Table 2-1 and Table 2-2 provide the summary 
                                                 
4 Skewness and kurtosis tests have been conducted to justify the log form of government expenditure. 
5 The result does not change much when the log of nonprofit expenditures is included in the model.  
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statistics for each of the variables finally included in the panel dataset, including their overall, 
between, and within variations.  
 
 
Table 2-1: Descriptive Statistics of the Dependent Variables  
 
Park Expenditure 
Categories Mean SD Min. Max. Observations 
Log of total direct 
expenditures 
overall 17.253 1.269 11.708 21.040 N =    3576 
between 
 
1.214 13.870 20.608 n =     149 
within 
 
0.380 13.295 19.508 T =     24 
Log of non-capital 
expenditures 
overall 16.976 1.188 11.677 20.484 N =    3576 
between 
 
1.150 13.626 20.255 n =     149 
within 
 
0.312 13.284 18.868 T =     24 
Log of capital 
expenditures 
overall 14.787 3.451 0 20.251 N =    3457 
between 
 
2.628 2.439 19.311  n =     149 
within 
 
2.246 -0.469 26.238  T =     24 
Percentage total 
direct expenditures 
overall 3.627 2.203 0.014 -0.950 N =    3576 
between 
 
1.685 0.893 8.856 n =     149 
within 
 
1.426 -1.283 33.429 T =     24 
Percentage non-
capital expenditures 
overall 3.138 1.647 .015 12.812 N =    3576 
between 
 
1.466 0.697 7.619 n =     149 
within 
 
0.760 -1.309 10.806 T =     24 
Percentage capital 
expenditures 
overall 6.156 7.182 0 73.815 N =    3457 
between 
 
3.593 0.047 17.565 n =     149 
within 
 
6.226 -10.439 70.259 T =     24 
Note: All the above categories are for parks and recreation services 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 55 
 
Table 2-2: Descriptive Statistics of the Independent and Control Variables  
 
Variable Mean  SD Min. Max. Observations 
Total nonprofit 
expenditures 
overall 0.942 5.607 0 101.191 N =    3576 
between 
 
5.016 0 59.5112 n =     149 
within 
 
2.538 -39.520 42.622 T =      24 
Log of median 
household income 
overall 10.922 0.181 10.403 11.537 N =    3576 
between  0.177 10.510 11.450 n =     149 
within  0.040 10.742 11.037 T =      24 
Log of median 
housing value 
overall 12.059 0.467 11.177 14.103 N =    3576 
between 
 
0.436 11.319 13.827 n =     149 
within 
 
0.170 11.292 12.616 T =      24 
Percentage 
homeownership  
overall 61.527 7.793 17.680 79.600 N =    3576 
between 
 
7.630 20.478 77.866  n =     149 
within 
 
1.700 50.722 67.289 T =      24 
Percentage 
population in 
poverty 
overall 12.871 4.150 4.478 30.520  N =    3576 
between  4.044 4.590 25.367 n =     149 
within  0.986 5.688 18.536 T =      24 
Median age 
overall 34.168 2.870 22.420 46.960 N =    3576 
between 
 
2.526 23.503 43.825 n =     149 
within 
 
1.377 28.318 39.798 T =      24 
Percentage white 
overall 73.429 14.515 26.622 99.299 N =    3576 
between 
 
14.061 31.473 98.074 n =     149 
within 
 
3.778 62.214 91.662  T =      24 
Percentage 
bachelor's degree or 
higher  
overall 26.952 7.366 10.130 59.360 N =    3576 
between 
 
6.888 12.605 50.118  n =     149 
within 
 
2.667 16.720 36.195 T =      24 
Percentage voted 
for the Democratic 
candidate 
overall 49.873 13.774 0 89.300 N =    3576 
between  11.978 0 81.729 n =     149 
within  6.872 26.827 76.183 T =      24 
Percentage 
intergovernmental 
revenue 
overall 37.531 10.597 12.790 71.499 N =    3576 
between 
 
9.729 16.643 64.392 n =     149 
within 
 
4.273 13.929 55.942 T =      24 
Percentage property 
tax revenue 
overall 26.055 10.173 6.675 72.064  N =    3576 
between  9.383 8.897 66.780 n =     149 
within  4.003 5.902 50.914 T =      24 
City Population 
overall 4.071 7.577 0.163 82.731 N =    3576 
between 
 
7.585 0.173 78.237 n =     149 
within 
 
0.494 -0.809 8.565 T =      24 
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Empirical Strategy 
A fixed effects (FE) model and a lagged dependent variable (LDV) model are estimated here as 
an identification strategy to investigate the impact of nonprofit expenditures on the public 
spending on parks and recreation services. They are used in this article for two major reasons. 
First, the FE model and the LDV model are two powerful panel data models and based on 
alternative identifying assumptions of the data generating processes, with the FE model 
assuming time-invariant omitted variables and the LDV model temporal dependence. In the 
context of this article, they are both valid for different methodological and theoretical reasons. 
However, there is the risk of a “Nickell bias” in which the combination of lagged dependent 
variables and fixed effects in the same model can bias the estimates (Nickell 1981; Ling 2012). 
Therefore, to strengthen the robustness of the findings, it is recommended that applied 
researchers use both models to see whether they generate similar results (Angrist and Pischke 
2009).  
 
Second, FE and LDV estimates have a nice bracketing property: bounding the causal effect of 
interest. If the underlying assumption of the LDV model is correct, but the FE model is used, 
estimates of a positive treatment effect by the FE model will be too large. On the other hand, If 
the underlying assumption of the FE model is correct, but the LDV model is used, estimates of a 
positive treatment effect by the LDV model tend to be too small. (Angrist and Pischke 2009, 
246). Therefore, by using both the FE and the LDV model, we are likely to have a range of 
possible causal effect of interest, with the true effect lying somewhere in between.   
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In the LDV model, the lagged dependent variable is included in the model to capture the 
persistence of public spending6. Theoretically, a city’s public spending on public services is 
expected to be heavily determined by its past levels. Scholars pointed out the LDV model may 
inflate the overall model fit, decrease the explanatory power of repressors, and cause the 
coefficients of explanatory variables to be biased downward (Ling 2012; Keele and Kelly 2006). 
In other words, the LDV model offers a conservative estimate of a possible causal effect, which 
makes a stronger case for the causal inference if the estimates of key explanatory variables turn 
to be significant in the LDV model. The LDV model equation can be written as:  
 
ln(GOVEXPARKS)i,t = α0 + α1 ln(GOVEXPARKS) i,t-1  + α2(NONPROFIT-SUPPORT)i,t-1 
+ α3(NONPROFIT-SUPPORT)2i,t-1 + β Xi,t-1 + εi,t 
 
ln(GOVEXPARKS)i,t is the natural log of city i’s various categories of real local governments’ 
expenditures on parks and recreation in year t. ln(GOVEXPARKS) i,t-1  is the natural log of the 
previous year’s real total expenditures in city i. (NONPROFIT-SUPPORT) i,t-1 is previous year’s 
expenditures of park-supporting charities in city i. (NONPROFIT-SUPPORT)2i,t-1  is the 
quadratic term of the expenditures of park-supporting charities. Xi,t-1 is a vector of control 
variables employed in the model. They are lagged for one year to allow for the reaction of the 
budget cycle. Subscripts i and t index city and time, respectively.  
 
In the two-way FE model, city fixed effects are included in the model to account for any time-
invariant difference between cities in the time frame of the study. In addition to some observable 
                                                 
6 The Levin-Lin-Chu unit root test and Harris-Tzavalis unit root test both suggest that the panel is stationary, thus 
justifying the use of lagged dependent variables in the model. 
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differences that are captured by the model, there may be some fundamental time-invariant 
differences between cities that may determine the levels of public spending on parks, such as the 
weather conditions and the natural endowment of the city. City fixed effects are a powerful way 
of accounting for those differences by giving each city a unique intercept. Year fixed effects are 
included to capture the influence of aggregate time trends, such as inflation and economic 
growth, thus reducing the bias to the estimates. By including city fixed effects, year fixed effects, 
and a series of control variables, the FE model enables a more consistent and unbiased estimate 
of the impact of nonprofit funding on public spending within a particular city. For the purpose of 
this article, since the key variable of interest, nonprofit expenditures on parks, varies across years 
and within cities, the two-way FE model is a powerful way of controlling for cross-unit 
unobserved heterogeneity (Ling, 2012). 
 
The two-way FE model is specified as the following equation: 
 
ln(GOVEXPARKS)i,t = α0 + α1(NONPROFIT-SUPPORT)i,t-1 + α2(NONPROFIT-SUPPORT)2i,t-1 
+ β Xi,t-1 + µi + λt + εi,t 
 
Compared with the LDV model, the lagged dependent variable is no longer in the FE model. 
Instead, µi and λt are included as city-specific and year-specific fixed effects in the model. Other 
components are identical in the two models. Robust standard errors are used to account for the 
potential heteroscedasticity of the error term in both models. The results of the analysis for 
different types of public spending on parks and recreation services are reported in the next 
section of the article. The estimates of the LDV model and the FE model are listed side by side to 
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facilitate comparison. Both the proportion and the absolute size of public spending on parks and 
recreation are estimated separately as dependent variables to show the impact of nonprofit 
expenditures on various aspects of the public spending on parks.  
 
Empirical Findings and Results 
The multivariate analysis of the total public spending on parks and recreation services is 
presented in table 2-3, table 2-4, and table 2-5. The market niche model would suggest a negative 
relationship between nonprofit spending and public spending on parks, while the 
interdependence model would suggest a positive relationship. The critical mass model would 
indicate that nonprofit spending is related to public spending on parks in a curvilinear pattern, 
initially in one certain direction related to public spending on parks but turning to the other 
direction as nonprofit spending on parks continues to rise. In the empirical model estimation 
results, the market niche model would be supported when both the coefficients for nonprofit 
spending and nonprofit spending squared are negative. The interdependence model would be 
supported when both the coefficients are positive. Finally, the critical mass model would be 
supported when the coefficients of the first and second order terms of nonprofit spending are in 
opposite signs. Since the main concern of this article is with the impact of nonprofit spending on 
public spending rather than the determinants of public funding for parks, the coefficients of 
control variables will not be interpreted here.  
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Table 2-3: FE and LDV Models of Local Governments’ Total Expenditures on Parks  
 
 DV: Log of Total 
Expenditures 
DV: Percentage Total 
Expenditures 
 FE LDV       FE LDV 
Lagged DV  0.897*** 
(0.0102) 
 0.717*** 
(0.0571) 
Nonprofit expenditures 
 
-0.0186*** 
(0.00575) 
-0.00300 
(0.00321) 
-0.0470*** 
(0.0179) 
-0.0298** 
(0.0119) 
Nonprofit expenditures 
squared 
0.000248*** 
(0.0000557) 
0.0000739** 
(0.0000290) 
0.000514*** 
(0.000156) 
0.000329*** 
(0.000107) 
Log of median household 
income 
0.968 
(0.843) 
0.0186 
(0.0941) 
-1.771 
(2.395) 
-1.726*** 
(0.440) 
Log of median housing 
value 
0.324 
(0.197) 
-0.00753 
(0.0235) 
0.934* 
(0.546) 
0.260*** 
(0.0967) 
Percentage homeownership  0.00286 
(0.0170) 
-0.00189 
(0.00122) 
0.0700 
(0.0545) 
0.00520 
(0.00458) 
Percentage in poverty -0.0392* 
(0.0222) 
-0.00504 
(0.00346) 
-0.134* 
(0.0705) 
-0.0638*** 
(0.0163) 
Median age -0.0394 
(0.0291) 
-0.00368 
(0.00281) 
-0.0668 
(0.0906) 
-0.0321*** 
(0.0121) 
Percentage White 0.00763 
(0.00768) 
-0.000657 
(0.000645) 
0.0273 
(0.0267) 
0.00125 
(0.00241) 
Percentage bachelor's 
degree or higher 
-0.0347** 
(0.0151) 
0.00118 
(0.00110) 
-0.0821* 
(0.0494) 
0.0137*** 
(0.00498) 
Percentage voted for the 
Democratic candidate 
0.00136 
(0.00456) 
0.000665 
(0.000639) 
0.000496 
(0.0139) 
-0.00124 
(0.00239) 
Percentage 
intergovernmental revenue 
-0.00502 
(0.00339) 
-0.00328*** 
(0.000786) 
-0.0129 
(0.0139) 
-0.0152*** 
(0.00357) 
Percentage property tax 
revenue 
-0.0107** 
(0.00430) 
-0.00380*** 
(0.000790) 
-0.0281 
(0.0201) 
-0.0119*** 
(0.00365) 
Population 0.166*** 
(0.0357) 
0.0253*** 
(0.00304) 
0.150 
(0.128) 
0.0264*** 
(0.00996) 
Population squared -0.000298** 
(0.000148) 
-0.000707*** 
(0.000140) 
0.000302* 
(0.000167) 
-0.000175 
(0.000149) 
Constant 4.338 
(8.492) 
2.106** 
(0.938) 
11.97 
(25.50) 
18.75*** 
(4.459) 
Observations 3427 3427 3427 3427 
Rho 0.888  0.637  
R2  0.933  0.590 
Note: DV = dependent variable. Robust standard errors are in the parentheses. Year and city dummies are 
not reported. Significance Level: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 2-3 reveals a strong evidence for the critical mass model, thus confirming hypothesis 3. 
Expenditures of park-supporting charities in a city indeed have a significant impact on the total 
public spending on parks and recreation services.  Moreover, such a relationship is robust and 
consistent for the total public spending on parks both in terms of the absolute spending size and 
its relative proportion of local governments’ total expenditures. In other words, expenditures of 
park-supporting charities influence not only how much local governments spend on parks, but 
also how local governments allocate their funds to parks and recreation services. Such an impact 
follows a curvilinear relationship both in size and in proportion: public spending on parks first 
decreases as the expenditures of park-supporting charities increase. However, as nonprofit 
spending continues to increase and reach a certain threshold, public spending on parks begins to 
increase as nonprofit spending continues increasing. This result is consistent with the estimates 
of both the FE and the LDV model, thus proving the robustness of the finding. As expected, the 
LDV model generates a significantly smaller coefficient than the FE model. This curvilinear 
relationship is shown in Figure 2-1.  
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Figure 1: Non-linear Relationships between Nonprofit and Public Spending on Parks 
  
 
 
 
 
By taking the first derivative of the equation and setting the equation to zero, it is possible to 
assess at what point expenditures of park-supporting charities begin to have a positive impact on 
public spending on parks. This threshold point can be termed as the “critical mass” (Meier 1993, 
407). The estimated “critical mass” of nonprofit spending is 20.30 to 37.5 million dollars for the 
absolute size of public spending on parks and 45.29 to 45.79 million dollars for the proportion of 
public spending on parks7. In other words, park-supporting charities in a city need to aggregately 
spend from 20.30 to 37.5 million dollars before they can bring in instead of reducing public 
spending on parks. From a substantive perspective, what should we make of this? To check the 
                                                 
7 The smaller number is estimated by the LDV model and the larger number by the FE model.  
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robustness of the critical mass model, we need to substantively understand how much proportion 
of the data is below or beyond the turn-around value.  
 
If the smallest number of the “critical mass”, 20.30 million dollars, is chosen, only 28 out of 
3576 observations (approximately 0.08%) have a nonprofit spending larger or equal to the 
“critical mass” value. If other “critical mass” values are taken, there are even fewer observations 
left in the dataset to reach the threshold8. For practical purposes, the quadratic to the right of the 
“critical mass” can be ignored. This suggests that for most cities in the dataset, more 
expenditures of park-supporting charities lead to less public spending on parks, which actually 
supports the market niche model. To the left of the “critical mass”, increasing one million dollars 
of nonprofit spending on parks has a decreasing effect on the percentage change in public 
spending on parks as large as 1.86 percent9. If the mean of a city’s public spending on parks, 
67.5 million dollars, is plugged in, the decreasing effect can be as large as 1.26 million dollars. 
This is a strong decreasing effect, although this decreasing effect becomes smaller as nonprofit 
spending on parks continues to rise.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 Most of those observations are the observations for the New York City in multiple years. 
9 This value is calculated by using the estimate of the FE model of the absolute size of public spending on parks.  
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Table 2-4: FE and LDV Models of Local Governments’ Non-Capital Expenditures on 
Parks  
 
 DV: Log of Non-Capital 
Expenditures 
DV: Percentage Non-Capital 
Expenditures 
 FE LDV       FE LDV 
Lagged DV  0.946*** 
(0.00994) 
 0.914*** 
(0.0136) 
Nonprofit expenditures 
 
-0.0235*** 
(0.00582) 
-0.00485** 
(0.00206) 
-0.0534*** 
(0.0165) 
-0.0145*** 
(0.00488) 
Nonprofit expenditures 
squared 
0.000225*** 
(0.0000513) 
0.0000627*** 
(0.0000195) 
0.000342** 
(0.000133) 
0.000127*** 
(0.0000414) 
Log of median household 
income 
1.666* 
(0.850) 
-0.0129 
(0.0647) 
1.784 
(2.165) 
-0.655*** 
(0.183) 
Log of median housing 
value 
0.246 
(0.196) 
-0.000781 
(0.0159) 
0.406 
(0.410) 
0.103** 
(0.0408) 
Percentage homeownership  0.00126 
(0.0133) 
-0.000889 
(0.000728) 
0.0302 
(0.0317) 
0.00278 
(0.00207) 
Percentage in poverty -0.0118 
(0.0252) 
-0.00345 
(0.00234) 
-0.0382 
(0.0691) 
-0.0200*** 
(0.00697) 
Median age -0.0285 
(0.0325) 
-0.00252 
(0.00187) 
-0.0553 
(0.0859) 
-0.0106** 
(0.00505) 
Percentage White 0.0108 
(0.00725) 
-0.000340 
(0.000434) 
0.0458** 
(0.0213) 
0.000722 
(0.00123) 
Percentage bachelor's 
degree or higher 
-0.0236 
(0.0155) 
0.000782 
(0.000812) 
-0.0220 
(0.0424) 
0.00552*** 
(0.00206) 
Percentage voted for the 
Democratic candidate 
0.00222 
(0.00421) 
0.000173 
(0.000428) 
0.00790 
(0.0112) 
-0.000244 
(0.00117) 
Percentage 
intergovernmental revenue 
-0.00277 
(0.00290) 
-0.00201*** 
(0.000539) 
-0.00119 
(0.00895) 
-0.00432*** 
(0.00145) 
Percentage property tax 
revenue 
-0.00435 
(0.00318) 
-0.00223*** 
(0.000540) 
0.00485 
(0.00867) 
-0.00380*** 
(0.00135) 
Population 0.123*** 
(0.0411) 
0.0123*** 
(0.00231) 
-0.0854 
(0.108) 
0.00380 
(0.00284) 
Population squared -0.00102*** 
(0.000368) 
-0.000132*** 
(0.0000305) 
0.000996 
(0.000834) 
-0.0000170 
(0.0000452) 
Constant -3.910 
(9.243) 
1.354** 
(0.626) 
-23.97 
(23.43) 
6.681*** 
(1.895) 
Observations 3427 3427 3427 3427 
Rho 0.930  0.848  
R2  0.966  0.869 
Note: DV = dependent variable. Robust standard errors are in the parentheses. Year and city dummies are 
not reported. Significance Level: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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By breaking down the public spending on parks to capital and non-capital expenditures, it is 
possible to detect which expenditure category drives above relationships and whether such 
relationships are robust across spending categories. From Table 2-4, the relationships for public 
non-capital spending on parks follow the same pattern as they do for public total spending on 
parks. There are significant curvilinear relationships between local governments’ non-capital 
spending on parks across model specifications and expenditures of park-supporting charities. 
From the model fit statistics perspective, the quadratic equation form captures the pattern of 
public non-capital spending on parks even better than public total spending on parks. Since 
public non-capital spending on parks is usually considerably larger than capital spending, such 
evidence may suggest that above curvilinear relationships are mainly driven by nonprofit 
spending’s impact on public non-capital spending on parks. Recent research also suggests that 
park-supporting charities are mainly engaged in operational-level works such as volunteer 
management, natural resource conservation, and offering recreation programs (Gazley et al. 
2016). The estimated “critical mass” is 38.68 to 52.22 million dollars for the absolute size of 
public non-capital spending on parks and 57.09 to 78.07 million dollars for the proportion of 
public non-capital spending on parks. Consistent with the pattern of public total spending on 
parks, few observations in the dataset reach the threshold of the “critical mass”, thus supporting 
the market model.  
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Table 2-5: FE and LDV Models of Local Governments’ Capital Expenditures on Parks  
 
 DV: Log of Capital 
Expenditures 
DV: Percentage Capital 
Expenditures 
 FE LDV       FE LDV 
Lagged DV  0.632*** 
(0.0316) 
 0.525*** 
(0.0301) 
Nonprofit expenditures 
 
0.0303 
(0.0322) 
0.0242 
(0.0148) 
0.00924 
(0.0742) 
-0.0850* 
(0.0492) 
Nonprofit expenditures 
squared 
0.000154 
(0.000249) 
0.0000899 
(0.000122) 
0.00106 
(0.000668) 
0.00120*** 
(0.000409) 
Log of median household 
income 
-6.909* 
(3.844) 
-0.301 
(0.648) 
-18.37** 
(8.961) 
-3.710** 
(1.703) 
Log of median housing 
value 
1.718** 
(0.861) 
-0.0465 
(0.173) 
4.489* 
(2.311) 
-0.0429 
(0.438) 
Percentage homeownership  0.0150 
(0.0681) 
-0.00133 
(0.00850) 
0.246 
(0.230) 
-0.0222 
(0.0214) 
Percentage in poverty -0.261** 
(0.121) 
-0.0408 
(0.0259) 
-0.555** 
(0.272) 
-0.228*** 
(0.0643) 
Median age -0.310** 
(0.135) 
-0.0517*** 
(0.0197) 
-0.282 
(0.312) 
-0.0893 
(0.0574) 
Percentage White 0.0474 
(0.0379) 
-0.00476 
(0.00516) 
0.0101 
(0.103) 
-0.0107 
(0.0117) 
Percentage bachelor's 
degree or higher 
0.00459 
(0.0710) 
0.00954 
(0.00822) 
-0.227 
(0.187) 
0.0204 
(0.0197) 
Percentage voted for the 
Democratic candidate 
-0.0323 
(0.0269) 
0.000193 
(0.00487) 
-0.0288 
(0.0612) 
0.000505 
(0.0110) 
Percentage 
intergovernmental revenue 
-0.000376 
(0.0216) 
-0.0260*** 
(0.00515) 
-0.0392 
(0.0589) 
-0.0257** 
(0.0124) 
Percentage property tax 
revenue 
0.0243 
(0.0244) 
-0.0389*** 
(0.00708) 
-0.125 
(0.0790) 
-0.0227* 
(0.0126) 
Population 0.556* 
(0.293) 
0.154*** 
(0.0147) 
0.897* 
(0.490) 
0.144*** 
(0.0365) 
Population squared -0.00573** 
(0.00238) 
-0.00199*** 
(0.000211) 
-0.00888** 
(0.00427) 
-0.00201*** 
(0.000558) 
Constant 77.39* 
(43.21) 
13.22** 
(6.549) 
162.6* 
(84.26) 
52.67*** 
(16.65) 
Observations 3427 3427 3427 3427 
Rho 0.593  0.370  
R2  0.555  0.308 
Note: DV = dependent variable. Robust standard errors are in the parentheses. Year and city dummies are 
not reported. Significance Level: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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According to Table 2-5, there seems to be an absence of relationships between nonprofit 
spending and public capital spending on parks. Only the LDV model of the percentage public 
capital spending on parks follows the similar patterns and turns to be statistically significant for 
the linear and quadratic terms of nonprofit expenditures. The other three models all suggest that 
there are positive relationships between nonprofit expenditures and public capital spending on 
parks, although the relationships are not statistically significant. However, joint F-tests for the 
parameters of the linear and quadratic terms of nonprofit expenditures are statistically significant 
at an alpha level of 0.05 across four model specifications, which suggests a statistically 
significant relationship between nonprofit expenditures and public capital spending on parks. 
However, the exact pattern of how nonprofit expenditures influence public capital spending on 
parks is not clear. From a substantive perspective, capital spending is generally more difficult to 
predict compared with operational spending. A local government’s decision to finance capital 
projects in parks may be determined by certain events or opportunities that are not captured in 
this estimated model, such as certain intergovernmental grant opportunities. In addition, a city 
does not need capital projects in parks as regularly as operational projects. This proposition is 
supported by the fact that models with public capital spending as the dependent variable have a 
consistently lower R-square or Rho compared with corresponding models for other spending 
categories.  
 
Finally, the value of the critical mass model deserves some further discussions. Although only a 
few cities are able to reach the “critical mass” in this study, thus generally supporting the market 
niche model, the critical mass theory seems to be a promising way of understanding government-
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nonprofit relationships. On the one hand, the strong evidence of a non-linear decreasing effect of 
nonprofit spending suggests that public nonprofit funding relationships do flatten out when 
nonprofit spending on parks continue to rise. In addition, even for cities that do reach the 
“critical mass” of nonprofit spending on parks such as New York, their inter-sectoral funding 
relationships tend to differ based on the stage and magnitude of such funding exchanges. Figure 
2 presents the trend of public and nonprofit spending on parks in New York. From the graph, we 
can see that from 1989 to 1995, public and nonprofit spending on parks change in opposite 
directions. However, from 1995 forward, public and nonprofit funding on parks both grow in 
similar patterns. This general pattern of public nonprofit relationships fit the critical mass models 
well. Such evidence suggests that the critical mass theory does help us understand such complex 
relationships better.   
 
Figure 2-2: Public and Nonprofit Spending on Parks in New York 
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Conclusion 
This study seeks to understand how the spending of charitable nonprofits created specifically to 
support city parks influences local governments’ spending on corresponding public services, 
especially when there is a significant funding flow from nonprofits to governments. Drawing on 
a unique panel dataset that contains the data of both nonprofit and major U.S. city public 
spending on parks and recreation services, this article uses multiple panel data analysis models to 
empirically test several prominent theories of government-nonprofit relationships. The findings 
suggest that expenditures of park-supporting charities in a city has a non-linear decreasing effect 
on public spending on parks, which supports the market niche model. In addition, the above 
relationship is mainly driven by local governments’ non-capital expenditures on parks. Although 
the critical mass model is not generally supported by the current data, the strong evidence of the 
quadratic relationship and the existence of few cities that do reach the “critical mass” threshold 
suggest that the critical mass theory and non-linear models are promising ways of disentangling 
complex relationships between nonprofits and governments. Finally, this article supports 
scholars’ concerns that government-nonprofit relationships may not be identical when subsectors 
rely on government funds in different ways (Grønbjerg & Paarlberg, 2001; Lecy & Van Slyke, 
2013). The interdependence model, which is found by multiple empirical studies in the nonprofit 
human services sector, is not supported by the findings of this study. This result suggests that the 
direction of funding flow seems to be a key concern in shaping government-nonprofit 
relationships.  
  
One limitation of this study is the presence of simultaneous causality between nonprofit and 
government expenditures. Although the two-way fixed effects model and lagged dependent 
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variables model are very powerful in terms of removing time-invariant confounding variables 
and taking temporal dynamics into consideration, this study cannot eliminate the simultaneity 
bias entailed in cross-sectoral interactions. However, this study does serve as the first step in 
understanding how nonprofits may influence governments and public service provision and the 
findings are robust across different model specifications. This research carries great potential for 
cross-national and cross-policy-area comparative applications. In addition, because of the 
structure of the IRS 990 data, this study cannot distinguish between nonprofit expenditures that 
are based on private contributions and government grants & contracts. However, since nonprofits 
operated in the field of parks and recreation are mainly donative charities10, the inability of 
distinguishing different sources of nonprofit revenues may not be as big a problem compared 
with other nonprofit sectors in which they heavily rely on government grants and contracts to 
provide services. Finally, limiting the analysis to the largest U.S. cities leaves out the possibility 
of testing different results for less populous and resourced communities, but these contexts are 
worthy of exploration.  
 
The conscientious selection of parks and recreation services is based on the rationale that the 
processes of how nonprofits would influence public service provision can be studied more 
effectively in a situation where there is a significant funding flow from nonprofits to 
governments. The contrast of findings between this study and previous empirical studies suggest 
that the direction of funding flow and the way we model government-nonprofit relationships do 
matter. The mechanisms for how governments influence nonprofits may be fundamentally 
                                                 
10 By merging the data with the NCCS-GuideStar National Nonprofit Research Database (the “Digitized Data”) 
which separates private contributions and government grants, the government grant ratio for these park-supporting 
charities is 7.18%, and program service ratio 14.9%. Those are considerably lower than the numbers of the general 
nonprofit sector. However, since the “Digitized Data” only contains public charities that filed form 990 from 1998 to 
2003, this database is not used for the scope of in this study.    
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different from the mechanisms for how nonprofits influence governments. A two-way 
understanding is essential for the theory building and development in government-nonprofit 
relationships. The next step is to apply the findings and theoretical insights gained from this 
study to different geographical and policy contexts. 
 
In addition, more in-depth qualitative research needs to be done to understand the causal 
mechanisms of why certain models work better at different stages of the relationship. New York 
stands out in the analysis as the case Field research and case studies could be done in New York 
or other places to examine why park-supporting charities could collectively have such an impact, 
what the network structure is for park-supporting charities in a city, what strategies nonprofits 
are using to influence the levels of public expenditures, and the distributional and performance 
implications of cross-sectoral interaction and collaboration, Those questions are not only 
important for parks and recreation services, but also for the better understanding of government-
nonprofit relationships and cross-sectoral interactions. This is a very promising line of research 
and contributes to the larger theory of whether and how nonprofits influence government.  
 
Fundamentally, this research suggests that nonprofits can indeed have an impact on public 
service provision. Broadening the research scope from the one-way impact of government 
funding on nonprofits to a two-way interaction is essential for further theoretical developments 
and a more nuanced understanding of government-nonprofit relationships. In this new context 
where nonprofits support and fund government services, new theories of government-nonprofit 
relationships may be required. This study starts this endeavor by bringing in one of the 
prominent models in collective action theories, the critical mass model. The findings of this 
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study suggest the possibility that governments may free-ride when nonprofits step in to fund and 
support public services. New theories in government-nonprofit relationships are needed to 
understand how nonprofits in certain subsectors and geographical contexts manage to overcome 
such collective action problems. The policy and management implications of studying such 
phenomenon tend to be also huge when governments at all levels and around the world are 
suffering from extensive budget cuts and financial losses.     
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CHAPTER 3 
GOVERNING PUBLIC-NONPROFIT PARTNERSHIPS: 
LINKING GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS TO COLLABORATION STAGES 
 
Abstract: 
Public-nonprofit partnerships have become increasingly popular in public service provision, 
especially when local governments suffer from ongoing fiscal stress. Using a grounded-theory-
based comparative case study approach, this paper draws on the experiences of the leaders of 
government-nonprofit partnerships for public parks in major cities of Ohio River Basin Region 
to address the questions of how partnerships are governed and how governance mechanisms vary 
among different stages of the collaboration continuum. Government representation on the 
nonprofit board, reaching a formal agreement, building relationships, and building leadership 
capacity stand out as four governance mechanisms for these partnerships. This paper also 
discusses how these governance mechanisms are likely to play out in different stages of the 
collaboration continuum.   
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Introduction 
Partnerships between nonprofit organizations and government agencies have received increasing 
attention from scholars ever since the privatization era in the 1980s (Gazley & Guo, 2015; Gray, 
1989). It began as scholars recognized the widespread cooperation between governments and 
nonprofits in the provision of social and human services in the welfare state (Salamon, 1986 & 
1987). The New Public Management (NPM) movement further shifted the role of government 
agencies from the direct producer of public services to the purchaser of public services (Osborne 
& Gaebler, 1992), thus highlighting the importance of government-nonprofit partnerships in 
public service provision. With the focus of outsourcing and contracting out in NPM and 
privatization, much of the previous literature on public-nonprofit partnerships emphasized the 
principal-agent relationships between the two sectors (Brinkerhoff, 2002). In such collaborative 
arrangements, nonprofits are still regarded as an instrument or extension of government agencies, 
thus having little opportunity in participating in joint decision making or sharing resources with 
government agencies (Gazley, 2008). 
 
Recent research in public and nonprofit management challenges the assumption that nonprofits 
are always the weaker actors compared to their government counterparts. Scholars found that 
nonprofit organizations can become powerful actors and play important roles in financing and 
supporting public services, such as public education (Neslon & Gazley, 2014), public libraries 
(Schatteman & Bingle, 2015), low-income public housing (Fyall, 2016), and public parks and 
recreation services (Gazley, Cheng, LaFontant, 2015). It is no longer possible to draw a distinct 
line between governments as financiers and nonprofits as implementers. As tremendous 
knowledge has been accumulated about public-nonprofit partnerships that are dominated by 
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contracting out arrangements, there is still relatively little research that focuses on the 
partnerships where nonprofit organizations play important roles in supporting and determining 
public services, especially about the governance mechanism for these partnerships to create 
public value. As society is facing more complex governance problems such as climate change 
and immigration, and governments at all levels suffer from increasing fiscal stress, these 
questions are of great practical significance for public and nonprofit managers.    
 
Based on the above motivations and inspired by Austin (2010)’s Collaboration Continuum 
framework, this study seeks to address the following research question: what are the governance 
mechanisms for public-nonprofit collaborations, particularly when nonprofits play an important 
role in supporting and determining public services? And how are these governance mechanisms 
linked to different stages of the collaboration continuum? This paper seeks the answer to these 
questions using a grounded theory approach based on interviews with the leaders of government-
nonprofit partnerships for public parks in major cities of the Ohio River Basin Region. Several 
governance mechanisms are identified and their linking mechanisms with collaborative stages 
are developed.  
 
The purpose of this study is not advocating for one model or one type of public-nonprofit 
partnerships. Instead, by pointing out the collaborative stages and governance mechanisms for 
these partnerships, this paper aims at filling the knowledge gap of the governance of 
collaboration, and provides practitioners with the tools and knowledge to manage different types 
of government-nonprofit partnerships. Public-nonprofit partnership is broadly defined as a type 
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of collaborative relationships between governments and nonprofits that involve “the linking and 
sharing of information, resources, activities, and capabilities by organizations in two or more 
sectors to achieve jointly an outcome that could not be achieved by the organizations separately” 
(Bryson et al., 2006, p.44). This term is used interchangeably in this study with cross-sectoral 
collaboration because both terms are prevalent in the public management literature to describe 
similar phenomena. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. It first reviews the collaboration continuum framework and 
recent literature of the governance of public-nonprofit partnerships. The next section presents the 
research context and empirical strategies used by this study. The third section presents the 
findings of different governance mechanisms used by these partnerships and how they are linked 
to different stages of the collaboration continuum. The paper concludes by discussing the 
implications and future steps of this research.  
 
The Collaboration Continuum Framework  
Because of the complexity of inter-organizational partnerships, scholars advocate for a view of 
collaborations as multi-stage, multi-dimensional, complex and dynamic processes that are 
embedded in the larger institutional and social system (Gazley & Guo, 2015). Over the years, 
there have also been multiple efforts of identifying different forms of inter-organizational 
partnerships (Austin & Seitanidi, 2012; Agranoff & McGuire, 2004; Herrenz, 2008; Guo & Acar, 
2005). This paper uses a modified collaboration continuum framework to map different stages of 
collaborative relationships. Although this framework was developed in the context of nonprofit-
  77  
 
business partnerships, insights of the collaboration continuum framework can be applied to 
public-nonprofit partnerships, especially when nonprofits are actively raising support or taking 
responsibilities for public agencies in partnerships. 
 
The collaboration continuum framework was developed by Austin (2000) to capture the dynamic 
nature and the evolution of collaboration. In this framework, there are three types or stages of 
collaborative relationships along the continuum: philanthropic, transactional, and integrative 
(Austin, 2010). As the relationship evolves along the continuum, the nature of the collaboration 
also changes, thus presenting different kinds of management and governance challenges for 
partnership managers. These stages are not discrete but rather overlapped with each other. As 
Austin (2000, p.72) pointed out: “The continuum is not a normative model; one stage is not 
necessarily better than another. Movement along the CC is the result of conscious decisions and 
explicit actions by the partners. Some partners may decide that lower levels of engagement may 
better suit their situations, objectives, or strategies.” Moving to a higher level of engagement can 
bring significant collaborative gains. However, it also presents more risks to the partnership and 
requires more managerial and leadership efforts for coordination. Before sharing more power 
and responsibilities with their partners, organizations need to make extensive investments to 
make sure that their partners have the willingness and capacity of fulfilling their commitments. 
In lower-level collaborative stages, the requirement for such commitment is much lower.     
 
The philanthropic stage refers to the stage when each partner provides input such as money or 
human resources while they are largely independent of each other. “The nature of the 
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relationship is largely that of charitable donor and recipient” (Austin, 2000, p.71). In such cases, 
nonprofits are regarded as a fundraising arm of corresponding public agencies. Although 
nonprofits can sometimes decide which government programs these donations may go to, they 
are usually not involved in the decisions about which programs should be offered in parks. 
Governments list the revenue gap and nonprofits are expected to raise money to meet these needs. 
A lot of public parks or public library supporting foundations are in this category. They are 
sometimes created by their government counterparts to fulfill the fundraising role exclusively.   
 
The transactional stage is characterized as “a mutually beneficial relationship in which there are 
two-way benefit flows that are consciously identified and sought” (Austin, 2000, p.74). In the 
context of public-nonprofit partnerships, nonprofits and governments may collaborate and 
coordinate with each other to provide recreational and educational programs to public service 
users. Compared with the philanthropic stage, nonprofits are not raising money for existing 
programs or facilities, but also actively mobilizing volunteers and developing relevant programs 
to support these services. They are in a quasi-transactional relationship with local governments in 
the sense that nonprofits and public services users get their desired programs and local 
governments getting monetary and volunteer support. From a public service perspective, this 
stage of the partnership represents a coproduction of public services with the joint efforts of 
governments and citizens (Brandsen & Pestoff, 2006). Since the “transaction” between 
governments and nonprofits are not as calculated as nonprofit-business partnerships, the 
transactional stage is reframed as the coproductive stage for public-nonprofit partnerships. 
Partnerships that involve active public service user groups usually fall into this category.    
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Integrative collaborations are defined as the stage in which the relationship looks like a joint 
venture and the mission of the collaboration is central to both organizations’ strategies. “People 
and activities begin to merge into more collective action and organizational integration” (Austin, 
2000, p.71). In the context of public-nonprofit partnerships, this stage of the relationship is 
reached when it is hard to distinguish the role of nonprofits and governments based on traditional 
characterizations. Governments and nonprofits essentially merge as a hybrid organization to 
jointly plan and manage public services.  
 
The Central Park Conservancy (CPC) and its partnership with the New York City set the golden 
standard for this type of relationships. In this partnership, the CPC raises money to manage, 
restore, and enhance Central Park while the Parks Commissioners and officials at NYC Parks are 
involved in all aspects of park planning, and retain the overall control of Central Park. Although 
a clear division of responsibility is still needed for partnerships in this stage, the line between 
public and nonprofit is blurred. It represents a high level of functional and strategic integration of 
both parties in the partnership.   
 
In summary, the Collaboration Continuum framework provides a useful lens for understanding 
how a public-nonprofit partnership may evolve over time. The transactional stage is reframed as 
the coproductive stage to make the framework more applicable to public-nonprofit partnerships. 
What is noticeable about the collaboration continuum framework is that collaboration stages are 
not mutually exclusive. Instead, higher stages of the collaborative relationships contain the 
elements of the relatively lower stages (see Figure 3-1). For example, when the collaborative 
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relationship reaches the integrative stage, partners are still conducting activities that are featured 
in the philanthropic and coproductive stages.   
 
Figure 3-1: Graphical Illustration of the Collaboration Continuum 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Governance of Cross-sectoral Partnerships  
Due to different kinds of management challenges presented by these partnerships, the 
governance of cross-sector partnerships has become a central issue in understanding how these 
partnerships work (Stone et al., 2010; Vangen et al., 2015). Compared with organizational 
governance, the governance of partnerships is more elusive since no clear entity may be in 
charge (Stone et al., 2010). In the literature of the governance of collaborations, structures and 
processes stand out as the key dimensions of understanding how actors “direct, coordinate, and 
Integrative Coproductive Philanthropic 
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allocate resource for the collaboration as a whole and to account for its activities.” (Vangen et al., 
2015, p.1244).  
 
Provan and Kenis (2008) provided a starting point for understanding basic governance structures 
in inter-organizational networks. Participant-governed networks are governed by formal and 
informal interactions of members and have no separate governance entity in the network. A lead 
organization structure is a network which has a core powerful organization to coordinate 
activities and make decisions for network members. A network administration organization 
structure is a network that has a separate organization formed to manage and coordinate network 
activities. Stone et al. (2010) used tensions inherent in the collaboration process to explain 
governance structure variances: inclusivity versus efficiency in member recruitment, flexibility 
versus stability of networks, internal versus external legitimacy, and the competing objectives 
among network members.  
 
In addition to governance structures, collective decision-making process and rules are also 
crucial for the success of collaborative partnerships. Ostrom (1990) used operation rules which 
govern day to day network activity, policy rules which determine what activities are allowed, 
sanctioned and monitored in networks, and constitutional rules which decide who can participate 
in the collective decision-making process and how collective choice rule can be changed, to 
describe the multilevel institutional components of self-governance systems. Ostrom (1990, 2005) 
further refined and developed eight essential elements or conditions (also known as the design 
principles) that characterize robust Common Pool Resource (CPR) institutions: (1) clearly 
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defined boundaries; (2) proportional equivalence between benefits and costs; (3) collective-
choice arrangements; (4) monitoring; (5) graduated sanctions; (6) conflict-resolution 
mechanisms; (7) minimal recognition of rights to organize; and (8) nested enterprises. Ostrom 
also showed how those institutional design principles “can affect incentives in such a way that 
appropriators will be willing to commit themselves to conform to operational rules devised in 
such systems, to monitor each other’s conformance, and to replicate the CPR institutions across 
generational boundaries” (p.91). Cox, Arnold, and Tomas (2010) found strong empirical support 
for these design principles through an analysis of 91 existing empirical studies that directly or 
indirectly evaluated Ostrom’s (1990) design principles in CPR settings. Given the fact that actors 
face inherent collective action problems of credible commitment and mutual monitoring in cross-
sectoral partnerships, those eight design principles may also be applicable to the governance of 
such partnerships.  
 
Context  
This research takes place in the context of public-nonprofit partnerships for public parks in large 
U.S. cities. Compared with other public services where governments collaborate with nonprofits 
in the delivery of public services, several distinct features stand out for these public-nonprofit 
partnerships. First, parks and recreation is a public service subsector where nonprofits 
collaborate closely with local governments to solve a public problem. Because of multiple 
community benefits urban parks and green spaces provide for the city, the management and 
funding of urban parks are traditionally regarded as a pure government function. However, 
because of the increasing demand of urban green spaces and the fiscal stress local governments 
are currently experiencing, local governments lack the capacity and are not expected to do this 
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alone (Walker, 1999). This is especially true if and when local parks and recreation services are 
considered a non-essential public service and under pressure of budget cuts (Skidmore & 
Scorsone, 2011). Such characteristics of parks and recreation services push local governments to 
explore alternative funding sources and intergovernmental or cross-sector collaboration 
opportunities.  
 
Public-nonprofit partnerships for city parks can be presented in multiple forms. They can be set 
up by active park users and focus on volunteering activities and programming support for public 
parks. A lot of park friends’ organizations and their partnerships with local governments are in 
this category. These partnerships can also be set up by local governments to raise money for 
public parks, such as most parks foundations. Recently, there is a movement for private park 
conservancies which take on the responsibility of managing and operating public parks (Harnik 
& Martin, 2015). The Central Park Conservancy (CPC) in the city of New York is the pioneer of 
this movement. It not only raises money for Central Park but is also involved in the planning, 
design, management, and maintenance of the park, via a formal long-term agreement between 
the city and the conservancy. The Central Park Conservancy and city’s parks department also 
created a joint position to facilitate coordination and management (Rosenzweig & Blackmar, 
1992). These diverse forms of public-nonprofit partnerships offer an ideal setting for answering 
the research questions of this paper.   
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Method 
Grounded-Theory-based Comparative Case Study Approach 
This paper uses a grounded-theory-based comparative case study method to examine the 
governance mechanisms of public-nonprofit partnerships and how they are linked to different 
stages of the collaboration continuum. This method is particularly suitable to generate theory and 
corresponding hypotheses from the data and cases (George & Bennett, 2005; Gerring, 2006). It is 
a way of looking at the phenomenon “empirically from the perspectives of those immersed in 
these arenas” (Agranoff, 2007, p.37). Different from other comparative case study methods, a 
grounded theory based comparative case study method does not rely on one fixed theory to 
examine multiple situations or cases. Instead, when analyzing data and cases, the grounded 
theory based approach allows data collection, analysis, and theory development to occur 
simultaneously. In other words, the researcher may start with certain theories or theoretical 
frameworks during the initial research design. However, the researchers allow new theory to 
emerge from existing data and guide future data collection and analysis strategies. As Strauss 
and Corbin (1998, p.12) pointed out: “a theory derived from data is more likely to resemble the 
reality than a theory derived by putting together a series of concepts based on experience or 
solely through speculation.” It is a very useful approach for public management scholars to “lay 
out how cutting edge practice can be conceptualized in a way that is useful to academic and 
practitioner alike” (Agranoff, 2007, p.35).  
 
Following Agranoff and Radin (1991, p.210 to p.216), this study follows the ten steps 
methodological sequence to carry out this research: 1) literature review and research question 
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development; 2) case and participant selection and invitation; 3) outline and structure the case 
studies 4) developing the discussion guide based on the literature and existing info of selected 
cases; 5) gathering related info about research sites and participants; 6) finalizing the discussion 
guide based on info already gathered for each case; 7) conducting interviews and site visit; 8) 
reflections and memos on the impression of the interviews; 9) synthesizing the info gathered 
from interviews, participant observations, and document analysis to develop the case; 10) 
analyzing the research questions and comparing across cases. Following these ten steps ensures 
the flexibility as well as the rigor of this research design.  
  
Content analysis of the nonprofit and government agency’s websites was conducted before 
carrying out formal interviews and stopping the recruitment of more research participants. This 
procedure was used to identify the collaborative stages of these partnerships and make sure all 
three stages are represented in the selected cases. Formal agreements and the memorandum of 
understanding (MOU) were also gathered from the interviewees before interview meetings. 
Based on the information on organizations’ websites, agreements of the partnerships, and other 
web sources, the researcher placed each partnership in different stages of the collaboration 
continuum. 
 
Semi-structured interviews serve as the primary data for this study. The interviews followed a 
general discussion guide that would be tailored to each specific interviewee according to existing 
info gathered about the partnership. The discussion guide included 1) history and the evolvement 
of the partnership; 2) the roles nonprofits and governments play in the partnership; 3) formal 
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agreement or informal coordination mechanisms of the partnership; 4) communication between 
nonprofit and government partners 5) mechanisms for addressing disagreements 6) important 
lessons learned from managing the partnership. Each topic included one to three probing 
questions to clarify meaning and fostering conversations. All but 1 of the 15 interviews were 
recorded during the interview process, after getting permissions for the interviewees. Field notes, 
existing documents, and the interview transcripts were then analyzed by the researcher to classify 
each partnership according to the collaboration continuum typology, and draw cross-case 
comparisons of their governance mechanisms. 
 
The collaboration stage of a public-nonprofit partnership is determined by the discussion 
question: “what role does your organization play in the partnership?” Since parks and recreation 
services are traditionally provided only by government agencies and governments own these 
properties, a more integrative partnership often means that governments share more power and 
responsibilities with partner nonprofits. The partnership is in the philanthropic stage when 
partner nonprofits are expected to only raise private donations for public parks. The coproductive 
stage is reached when nonprofits not only raise money but also deliver and provide programming 
support. The partnership reaches the integrative stage when nonprofits share the management 
and operational responsibilities with local governments. Using this criterion, the collaboration 
continuum framework was applied to the selected government-nonprofit partnerships.  
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Case Selection and Description of Participants  
Park supporting nonprofits are identified through a unique city park-supporting nonprofits 
database that was constructed by the author through a keyword search and the National 
Taxonomy of Exempt Entities (NTEE) code identification of the 2013 National Center for 
Charitable Statistics (NCCS) database. This database contains nearly three hundred nonprofit 
organizations that are set up with a primary purpose of supporting a city or county park in the 
149 largest U.S. cities. Geographical locations are narrowed down to the major cities or counties 
of the Ohio River Region, which include Indianapolis in Indiana, Nashville in Tennessee, 
Louisville in Kentucky, Cincinnati in Ohio, Columbus in Ohio, and Pittsburgh in Pennsylvania. 
This region is selected because major cities in this region are usually regarded as peer cities in 
terms of their social and economic development (Urban Studies Institute, 2014). However, the 
characteristics of their park systems and the forms of their government-nonprofit partnerships for 
parks vary significantly. Columbus and Franklin County Metro Parks (overlapped with the city 
of Columbus), Great Parks of Hamilton County (overlapped with the city of Cincinnati), and 
Allegheny County (overlapped with the city of Pittsburgh) are included in this study since these 
governmental agencies also manage public parks that are within the boundaries of these major 
cities.  
 
The city park-supporting nonprofits database is then matched with the above geographical 
regions to identify possible public-nonprofit partnerships in this region, since those park-
supporting nonprofits often partner with local governments to provide funding, programming, or 
management support for the entire park system or specific park units. After utilizing this strategy, 
there were 13 public-nonprofit partnerships identified. Interviewees were then selected and 
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contacted based on these thirteen partnerships. They are individuals who take key leadership 
roles in the parks department or the park-supporting nonprofit organization of the partnership, 
which may include the parks department director, executive director, or the board chair of the 
nonprofit organization. 25 individuals were finally contacted by the researcher, which include 11 
public managers and 14 nonprofit managers. After three rounds of contacts and invitation (first 
two rounds in email and the third round by phone), 15 individuals representing 11 public-
nonprofit partnerships accepted the interview invitation and participated in the study, including 4 
public managers and 11 nonprofit managers. The other 10 individuals either declined or did not 
respond to the research participation request. Interviews were carried out either in person or on 
the phone, ranging from 30 minutes to 75 minutes. Table 3-1 lists the partnerships, their 
locations and major purposes.  
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Table 3-1: Summary of Selected City Park Partnerships 
CITY Public Partner Nonprofit Partner Main Purpose 
Louisville, 
KY 
Louisville Metro 
Parks Department, 
Louisville Metro 
Government 
21st Century Parks Creation, maintenance, and 
management of The 
Parklands of Floyds Fork.  
Louisville, 
KY 
Louisville Metro 
Parks Department 
Louisville Parks 
Foundation 
Raising financial support for 
120 public parks and 
recreational facilities owned 
by Louisville Metro Parks 
Department.  
Indianapolis, 
IN 
Indianapolis Parks & 
Recreation 
Department, 
Indianapolis 
Department of Public 
Works 
Indianapolis Parks 
Foundation 
Providing resources and 
raising financial support for 
Indy’s Parks, trails, 
greenways, and public 
spaces.  
Indianapolis, 
IN 
Indianapolis Parks & 
Recreation 
Department 
Friends of Garfield 
Park 
Providing financial 
assistance, programming, 
and maintenance to the 
Garfield Park. 
Indianapolis, 
IN 
Indianapolis Parks & 
Recreation 
Department 
Eagle Creek Parks 
Foundation 
Providing financial and 
volunteer resources above 
and beyond limited city 
funding to support essential 
park projects and programs 
in the Eagle Creek Park.  
Nashville, 
TN 
Nashville Metro Parks 
and Recreation 
Department 
Friends of Warner 
Parks 
Providing financial and 
volunteer support for trail 
maintenance, educational 
programs, land acquisition, 
and facilitate construction in 
Warner Parks.   
Pittsburgh, 
PA 
The City of 
Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh 
Department of Parks 
and Recreation, 
Department of Public 
Works, Department of 
City Planning 
Pittsburgh Parks 
Conservancy 
Forming an alliance to 
provide improvement, 
special care, and restoration 
for the City’s four regional 
parks. 
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Pittsburgh, 
PA 
County Government 
of Allegheny, 
Allegheny County 
Department of Parks, 
Allegheny County of 
Department of Parks  
Allegheny County 
Parks Foundation 
Supporting the improvement, 
preservation and restoration 
of nine county parks 
consisting of 12,000 acres 
strategically located 
throughout Allegheny 
County. 
Columbus, 
OH 
Columbus and 
Franklin County 
Metro Parks 
Audubon Society of 
Ohio 
Supporting and operating the 
Grange Insurance Audubon 
Center located in the Scioto 
Audubon Metro Park. 
Cincinnati, 
OH 
Great Parks of 
Hamilton County  
Great Parks 
Foundation 
Providing financial 
assistance for Great Parks of 
Hamilton County, its 
facilities, and programs.  
Cincinnati, 
OH 
Cincinnati Parks 
Department 
Cincinnati Parks 
Foundation 
Supporting the conservation 
and enhancement of city’s 
parks and green spaces, 
including the creation of the 
Smale Riverfront Park.  
 
 
Governance Mechanisms for Government-Nonprofit Partnerships 
Following Vangen et al. (2015, p.1244), the governance of these partnerships “entails design and 
use of a structure and processes that enable actors to direct, coordinate, and allocate resources for 
the collaboration as a whole and to account for its activities”. Several discussion questions were 
used to identify the governance mechanisms of the partnerships. These questions include “How 
do you figure out your roles in the partnership?” “How do you make sure that your partner will 
continue investing in the partnership and keep the agreement (if there is one)?” and “what do you 
think is the most important thing in managing the collaborative relationship?” Several recurring 
themes were developed from the interviews and document analysis. Some of them echoed the 
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major findings of current research on the governance of collaboration, while some beyond the 
current state of knowledge.  
 
Governance of Partnerships as Government Representation on the Nonprofit Board 
Government officials appointing the executive director or sitting on the board of partner 
nonprofit organizations stands as one common governance mechanism for these partnerships. 
Out to the 10 partnerships in this study, seven partnerships have this mechanism in place. For the 
other three partnerships, nonprofits made conscientious decision not to formally place 
government officials and public managers on the board to keep the independence, or the image 
of independence of the nonprofits. However, public managers are still invited and actively 
participating in the board meetings (for one of the partnership, the parks director served as the 
executive of the partner nonprofit for a long time). Appointing government officials on the board 
of the partner nonprofit is an easy way of keeping track of what the partner nonprofit is doing in 
the park. From the perspective of the partner nonprofit, having government officials on their 
board would increase their legitimacy and provide open channels of communication with public 
officials (Malatesta & Smith, 2014). However, it may also represent a certain degree of 
government control over the partner nonprofit, thus resulting in negative consequences for the 
partnership such as the confusion for potential donors.  
 
Similar practices have been found in social and human services nonprofits which rely 
extensively on governments for funding (Guo,2007; Van Slyke, 2007; Grønbjerg, 1993). These 
nonprofits are also seeking board members that have governmental affiliations to obtain 
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government funding. However, in the case of government-nonprofit partnerships for parks, 
government officials sitting on the nonprofit board is usually a condition of the formal 
partnership agreement. These board members with government affiliations are usually ex officio 
members of the nonprofit board, which means that such board members are appointed only 
because of their current position in the government.  
 
By appointing government officials as ex officio members of the nonprofit board, local 
governments establish a formal mechanism in transforming the governance of a partnership to 
the governance of a single organization, which is less elusive and facilitates easier managerial 
oversight (Stone et al., 2010). For the three cases of the integrative partnerships, this is usually 
not optional and there is a legal mandate of such practices to ensure government representation 
and public oversight over the partnership nonprofits. For example, one formal agreement of the 
partnerships clearly states how government officials should be represented on the nonprofit 
board.  
Conservancy by-laws shall provide for the appointment of various ex-officio members to 
its board of directors as well as the appointment of certain other directors as well as for 
the appointment of certain other directors by the Mayor. In particular, the appointment of 
at least 5 board members shall be the power of the Mayor with the confirmation of City 
Council. In addition, ex officio members of the board shall include the Mayor, the 
Director of the City’s Department of Parks and Recreation, the Director of the 
Department of Public Works and the Director of City Planning.  
 
Proposition 3-1: Integrative partnerships are more likely to have a legal mandate of public 
oversight and government representation on the board of the partner nonprofit organizations. 
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Governance of Partnerships as Formal Agreements 
Establishing a formal agreement is another major mechanism of how these partnerships are 
governed. Although a contract or formal agreement is optional for a public-private partnership 
(Peters, 1998), it does provide clarity and formality to the partnerships. 5 out of the 10 
partnerships rely on a formal agreement or MOU to govern the interactions between 
governments and nonprofit organizations. For partnerships that do not have a formal agreement, 
the predominant reason is that the relationship is very stable and has worked well. There is no 
reason for an agreement until something goes wrong. All the integrative partnerships rely on a 
formal agreement. When talking about the most important thing about managing the 
collaborative relationship, one nonprofit manager stated that:   
A clear agreement that clearly states authority and responsibility is the most important 
thing. You need to be clear about who is responsible and the resources they have for that 
responsibility. Something is going to change. Personal relationships may and will fall 
apart. You must have very clear accountability mechanisms built in the partnership. 
 
Corresponding well to this comments, one nonprofit manager in a partnership that does not has a 
formal agreement with the city stated the disadvantages of relying on the intentions of public 
officials and political leaders.   
Current Mayor really sees our value. However, the past Mayor may not. There can be 
tensions depending on who is in charge politically. We do not care who takes charge 
politically as long as they love parks. When they do not value what we do, it is difficult to 
do what we do. We do not have the support from the city. We had a previous park 
director that did not really care about parks. It makes my job tougher. 
 
When comparing the agreements reached by integrative partnerships with the other two types of 
partnerships, one clear distinction stands out. Philanthropic and coproductive partnerships 
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emphasize more on the responsibilities of the partner nonprofits and the provisions of risk 
management and insurances. It serves as a major mechanism for governments to make sure that 
nonprofit does not do things wrong. One public official stated that: “The major challenge of 
relying on nonprofits is insurance and liability. The formal agreement is set up to address these 
issues.”  
 
For the integrative partnerships, although the risk management and liability provisions are an 
important part of the agreement, the agreement is more about specifying the roles, rights, and 
responsibilities of each party in the partnership. With these clearly defined boundaries (Ostrom, 
2005), partners are less likely to have role ambiguities. In addition, there are also provisions in 
the agreement that constrain both governments and nonprofits. For example, the agreement of 
one integrative partnership clearly stated that: “the conservancy, preservation, and maintenance 
of the Property will be done only in accordance with the Master Plan.” It is made clear that the 
master plan is the boss, instead of the public or nonprofit manager. This provision creates 
incentives for the nonprofit partner to continue investing in public parks without the worry of 
governments overturning their projects. The agreement is a result of negotiations between two 
equals.   
 
Proposition 3-2: Integrative partnerships are more likely to rely on formal agreements to 
structure the interactions of partners, which clearly states the rights and responsibilities of each 
partner, and include provisions at the constitutional level that govern both parties.  
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Governance of Partnerships as Building Relationships  
Although a clearly stated and thoughtfully developed formal agreement plays an instrumental 
role in governing collaborative relationships, public and nonprofit managers also realize that a 
formal agreement cannot solve every problem and it is sometimes unnecessary. A good 
relationship with the partner will create clearer mutual expectations, therefore creating a 
common vision and reducing transactions costs in the collaborative endeavor. One public official 
described why communication and building relationships are important for managing the 
partnership: 
The MOU is very direct and clear. However, the real works happen between the lines. I 
know their director’s number by heart and I can call her right now and say we need to this, 
can you help? I know that she will say yes if she can. The MOU will draw hard lines and 
govern what it is. The gray areas are much more important than the black and white ones. 
 
When talking about how to build relationships with government officials, one interviewee listed 
the importance of common exposure through which public and nonprofit managers can spend 
extensive time together and jointly envision the possibility of the partnerships (before the 
partnership took shape, public officials and nonprofit managers went out for field trip in the New 
York City together to learn from NYC’s park management experiences). In addition to common 
exposure, one nonprofit manager also stated the importance of a constructive mindset in building 
successful collaborative relationships:  
It is important to understand that while fundraising is the primary goal. There are many 
ways that the foundation can be helpful to the government department. Getting close 
enough to them to figure those out is very helpful in building the relationship. It is 
important to have the bigger picture in line instead of sticking to this is what I do and this 
is what you do. I can help the county government do their job if I can do it in a helpful 
way. It is helpful to have people in this organization that has experiences with the 
government and know what their constraints are. You must understand that to work with 
them successfully. 
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These quotes suggest that personal level interactions and relationship building must go hand in 
hand with those formal rules on the paper. It creates trust and more fluid communication 
channels between the partners. This is especially true when there is no formal agreement to rely 
on. All the partnerships that do not have a formal partnership agreement listed communication 
and a good relationship with the partner as the most important thing in managing the 
collaborative relationship. One nonprofit manager explained: 
You must build a good relationship with the park manager. They will be your 
representatives downtown. It is important to have a strong relationship with the park 
manager because they are usually supporting the park unit, instead of the downtown 
parks department. If the relationship is not good, more efforts need to spent on persuasion, 
instead of actual programs. You do not have much control over who is in the 
administration. So your next best thing is the personal relationship, which is one on one. 
You are more likely to get support if you talk to and look at them. Get to know who you 
are dealing with and look for common ground.”    
 
Proposition 3-3: Integrative partnerships are more likely to rely on both formal structures and 
personal relationships for the governance of the partnership, while philanthropic and 
coproductive partnerships tend to extensively rely on personal relationships.   
 
Governance of Partnerships as Building Leadership Capacity 
The fourth governance mechanism standing out in the interviews is building leadership capacity, 
especially on the nonprofit side. Nonprofit partners are expected to signal to the public and local 
governments that they have the capacity and commitment to fulfill their promises. This is 
especially true for integrative public-nonprofit partners as governments are expected to involve 
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nonprofits in some of the core parts of public service provision, such as the planning and 
management of public services. Because of the constraints local governments face, public 
managers do not often have the resources and attentions devoted to the partnerships. If nonprofits 
can take the initiative and demonstrate to the governments that they are capable and committed 
to the improvement of the public services instead of their own organizational benefits, local 
governments are more likely to put trust in nonprofits and share more responsibilities with them. 
One nonprofit leader articulates the reasons why the governance of collaboration comes in the 
form of building leadership and driving the direction of the partnership: 
The city has a much broader agenda. If you are the mayor, you have to worry about the 
police, the fire, taxes, companies moving in and moving out, and everything. So, to get 
the attention of governments, have them know what you are doing, and give their 
blessing, is sometimes challenging. It is not even the problem that they are hostile to or 
against it, it is just hard to get their attention. Then, another problem is that the way our 
city is organized is in the separation of governments, makes it harder than other places 
because you cannot just talk to the parks department. You have to talk to the department 
of public works, and the parks department, the city planning department, and the city has 
a sustainability coordinator. It has a lot of touch points, which consumes resources and 
makes it challenging to coordinate. We have tried very hard to go through all these touch 
points. This is a big challenge for us.  
 
By the same token, because there is not a strong parks director in the governmental 
structure, this gives us the opportunity to become a thought leader. Who else will 
coordinate all these? If you are the director of the Department of Public Works, no matter 
how much you love parks, you still have to think first about the road maintenance, snow 
removal, and all these other things.   
 
On the other hand, stronger leadership capacity presented by nonprofit organizations would also 
generate more public trust for the partnerships, therefore sustaining the operation of the 
partnerships. When being asked about how the nonprofit would be able to fight back if one 
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member of the city council does not follow the partnership agreement, one nonprofit manager 
responded:   
The agreement has the tool to do it. However, more important than that, we do a better 
job than Metro Parks. It is our delivery of service standards that are so high, that if 
someone wants to blow it up, the public would probably rise and revolt. This agreement 
rotates automatically unless a member of the city council has a question about the 
agreement. We are on our second 5 years. We are the gift that they can get credit for 
without spending a lot on. We are taking responsibilities, and smart politicians are going 
to like us. 
 
We have a very robust financial backing, through revenue generation, endowment, and 
annual fund. We secured the confidence of our public partner when we were able to raise 
13 million for capital projects by ourselves. There is a level of credibility and business 
planning built into it.  
 
Because of the newness of involving nonprofits in the management and maintenance of public 
parks, it requires a leap of faith and deeper commitment from the public sector to move the 
partnership to the next level. On the other hand, it also requires the nonprofit to have the 
confidence that they can deliver the promises if they take on more tasks. Building stronger 
leadership capacity therefore stands out as a key mechanism of governance of collaborations, 
especially for integrative partners which “demand more managerial and leadership effort, and, 
therefore, entail a much deeper commitment” (Austin, et al., 2012, p.743). Stone et al. (2010, 
p.315) also found that strong informal leadership is very important for the success of public-
nonprofit partnerships since “collaboration participants cannot rely on easily enforced, 
centralized direction or persons in positional authority roles.”  
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Proposition 3-4: Integrative partnerships are more likely to involve nonprofit partners that have 
strong leadership capacities.  
 
Implications, Limitations, and Future Research 
This study identifies the governance mechanisms of public-nonprofit partnerships and how they 
are linked to different stages of the collaboration continuum. It addresses the knowledge gap 
about how multi-sectoral partnerships are governed (Stone, et a., 2010) and insufficient attention 
to different forms of nonprofit collaboration (Gazley & Guo, 2015, p.25). In the context of 
public-nonprofit partnerships for public parks, the findings of this paper “supports a narrative of 
growing nonprofit power and reduced government control” (Fyall, 2016 p.947). Nonprofit 
organizations have great potential and are playing more and more important roles in public 
service provision through these partnerships. However, as recognized by both existing research 
and the interviewees, it does not necessarily mean that every successful partnership must move 
from the philanthropic stage to the integrative stage. One nonprofit manager said it best.  
The ultimate democratic delivery of the public service is a great park. I see so many park 
systems that lose track of that in the name of certifications or I need to have this amount 
of public inputs. You can see people losing track. But there are great public systems out 
there, such as Minneapolis, Seattle, and Portland. And there are bad private ones. Just 
going private will not guarantee that you can be successful. There is no silver bullet. I am 
agnostic on the operational model. If there is a great public sector, go to the public-sector 
rout. You have to find the model that meet the resources and competence that are unique 
to each community. I am not for duplicating an operational model at the national level. 
You cannot. You will never see us jump into another city to say be us and do us! Every 
situation is unique… There is a continuum of park services from public to private. You 
need to find your place in the continuum that makes sense to you. But you have to be 
intentional about it. You cannot just be accidental. You have to think your way through.  
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Four governance mechanisms are identified in this study: government representation on the 
nonprofit board, establishing formal agreements, building relationships, and building leadership 
capacity. It resonates with existing literature’s emphasis on the structures, processes, and rules 
for the governance of collaboration (Vangen et al., 2015; Stone, et al., 2010; Ostrom, 2005). This 
study also specifies the linkage between these governance mechanisms and different stages of 
the collaborative relationships. Integrative partnerships are more likely to be developed when 1) 
there is a legal mandate for government representation on the nonprofit board; 2) partners rely on 
formal agreements that structure multiple levels of interactions among partners; 3) partners do 
not exclusively rely on good personal relationships; and 4) the partnership involves a nonprofit 
partner with strong leadership capacities.  
 
There are some limitations of the paper that must be noted. First, although the author has made a 
conscientious effort to reach out to both public and nonprofit managers, there are more nonprofit 
managers who accepted the study invitations. Therefore, the conclusion of this paper may be 
biased towards the perspective of nonprofit managers. Further research could be conducted to 
represented more balanced responses of public and nonprofit managers, and compare these 
responses. The second limitation is the uniqueness of the parks and recreation context. The 
propositions of this study should be validated by qualitative research in other public service 
subsectors and larger N survey research. In addition to parks and recreation services, similar 
public-nonprofit partnerships have been set up in education, public libraries, art, and public 
safety. It will be great to see whether these governance mechanisms play out differently in these 
sub-sectors and there are additional governance mechanisms to manage these partnerships.   
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Fundamentally, being successful in managing and governing partnerships requires an open mind 
and continuous learning. This trend of public-nonprofit partnerships for public service provision 
has important implications for local government management and urban governance. There is so 
much to be explored and learned as we enter the age of collaboration and partnerships. One of 
the interviewees who had rich experiences in managing public parks thus concluded with the 
following quote: 
I do not think there is a more interesting time working in parks than now because of all 
these operational models and neat approaches that we have at our disposal. 30 years ago, 
it was all public and you were locked in. Now we are figuring out how to make these 
public-private partnerships work in a way that people never thought this could be 
possible. It is really interesting to see how this has evolved… I did not study anything 
about it in my college twenty years ago. But in my career this is what defines my career: 
the ability to develop, define, and create partnerships and execute them.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation uses multiple qualitative and quantitative methods to examine the process and 
consequences of nonprofits becoming important players in determining and supporting 
government service provision, especially when there is a reverse funding flow from nonprofits to 
governments. The dominant approach to the study of government-nonprofit relationships focuses 
on the contracting regime in which the role of nonprofits is limited to the delivery and production 
of public services. Increasingly, however, local governments are relying on nonprofit 
organizations for the provision and financing of public services. The form of nonprofit support 
for public services is moving from co-production to co-governance. This offers great 
opportunities as well as challenges to public and nonprofit managers to fully unleash the value of 
nonprofit organizations in public service provision. This dissertation contributes to the 
understanding of this increasingly important phenomenon and theory development of 
government-nonprofit relationships.  
 
The overarching hypothesis of this dissertation is that government-nonprofit relationships will 
show different patterns when there is a reverse funding flow from nonprofits to governments. 
The statistical analysis of the two quantitative chapters supports this hypothesis. In the context of 
local parks and recreation services in large U.S. cities, when park-supporting nonprofits spend 
more on local parks and recreation services, governments are likely to spend less on parks. Park-
   
103 
 
supporting nonprofits are more likely to get involved in the public park master plan process, or 
co-governance, when local governments have a lower capacity in providing parks and recreation 
services. These results challenge the conventional wisdom developed from the subsector of 
social and human services in which nonprofits rely on local governments for funding.  
 
Findings from the qualitative chapter suggest several mechanisms that these public-nonprofit 
partnerships can be governed and how these governance mechanisms are linked to the stages of 
the collaborative relationships. To fully unleash the value and power of nonprofit organizations, 
local governments need to delegate more power to nonprofit organizations. These governance 
mechanisms are helpful for public and nonprofit managers to better create, design, plan, and 
implement such partnerships. The interaction between formal and informal governance 
mechanisms seems to be a key in understanding the evolvement of these partnerships.  
 
Combining quantitative and qualitative evidence, this dissertation provides useful theoretical 
frameworks and new data for the understanding of government-supporting nonprofits and their 
relationships with local governments. Informed by the literature of government-nonprofit 
relationships, polycentric governance, coproduction, and cross-sectoral collaboration, this 
dissertation brings all these different theoretical perspectives together and offers a 
comprehensive analysis of how government-supporting nonprofits may influence the behaviors 
of local government and how they are involved in the co-governance of public services. As local 
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governments suffer from resource constraints and extensively use collaborative approaches to 
solve public problems, this research topic deserves more scholarly attention and represents a 
particularly promising line of future research in public and nonprofit management. The next 
section offers suggestions for future research that may advance our understanding of this 
important topic and contribute to public management scholarship.  
 
Future Research 
Since the limitations and future research directions for each paper have been extensively 
discussed in the previous chapters, I will focus this section on the research directions that can 
move the whole conversation forward and get this line of scholarship situated in some of the key 
questions in public and nonprofit management.  
 
The first promising line of future research is about the performance implications of public-
nonprofit partnerships and charitable support for public services. Does charitable support lead to 
better public service outcomes? Findings of this dissertation provide alternative hypotheses for 
this research question. On the one hand, local governments may free-ride and divert public 
resources for other uses when nonprofits are involved in supporting and financing public services. 
Because of the possibility of philanthropic failure, this may put the stability and quality of 
corresponding public services in jeopardy. On the other hand, government-supporting nonprofits 
may cultivate a higher level of community engagement and coproduction of public services, 
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therefore improving the quality and cost-effectiveness of public services. Future research should 
gather new data and use appropriate empirical approaches to test these theoretical hypotheses 
and address the performance implications of the charitable support for public services.  
 
From a theoretical point of view, complex public funding structures of public services, 
complicated by nonprofit support for public services, present unique opportunities for theoretical 
development and testing in the literature of polycentric governance. The concept of polycentric 
governance is coined by Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren, (1961) to examine the consequences of 
government fragmentation in U.S. metropolitan areas (McGinnis, 2016). The concept can be 
defined as a structural feature of social systems of decision centers having limited and 
autonomous prerogatives and operating under an overarching set of rules (Ostrom, 1972). The 
U.S. urban park systems can be characterized as a polycentric governance system: city parks are 
governed and funded by multiple, independent, yet overlapping jurisdictions and public/private 
actors. Urban parks located within the city boundaries can be funded and managed by the federal 
government, state government, city government, county government, special park district, or 
some park-supporting nonprofit organizations. Future research can build on the data and 
empirical evidence presented in this dissertation, and address the broader question of the 
consequences of a more polycentric public service provision system.  
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Another fruitful direction for future research is about the social and environmental justice 
implications of charitable support for public services. Do public-nonprofit partnerships challenge 
the “publicness” of public services? Who really benefits from these partnerships? How is urban 
governance transformed by the involvement of non-state actors in the arena where local 
governments traditionally play a dominant role in determining and financing public services? 
Given extensive evidence that racial minorities and socially disadvantaged groups do not have 
the same level of access to public services as other social groups do, it will be important to 
understand whether charitable support for public services and public-nonprofit partnerships 
alleviate or exacerbate such disparities. It will also be useful to examine the emergence and 
consequences of community initiatives that are set up to ensure a more equitable distribution of 
public services. For example, the New York City has set up the Community Parks Initiative to 
improve local parks that are located in densely populated neighborhoods and have not been 
supported by significant capital investment in the last decade. Who are making the decisions in 
these initiatives? What criteria are used in the decision-making process? What roles do citizens, 
businesses, and nonprofits play in these city-wide initiatives? Do these initiatives really change 
the allocation of capital projects in the neighborhoods? Both in-depth qualitative research and 
quantitative spatial analysis with geographic information system (GIS) will provide insights into 
these important questions.  
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Policy and Management Implications 
The main argument of the dissertation is that nonprofits can become important actors in 
supporting and financing public services. Findings support this argument by pointing out how 
nonprofits’ involvement in public service provision influences local governments’ budgetary 
decisions and how nonprofits shape the planning and design of public services. The prevalence 
of public-nonprofit partnerships and the rapid growth of charitable support for public services 
provide new opportunities as well as challenges for public and nonprofit managers.  
 
For public managers, it is important to have an open mind of the opportunities and resources 
nonprofits may bring to the table, even for public services that are traditionally financed and 
managed by local governments. This research suggests that public managers are very active and 
entrepreneurial in terms of attracting community and philanthropic support for public services, 
and this trend is robustly growing. The ability to discover, create, and implement partnerships 
has become an essential skill for public managers. By unpacking the black box of this emerging 
phenomenon, this research aims at stimulating further discussions about the distribution and 
performance consequences of these efforts. Government-supporting nonprofits represent an 
institutional innovation for public managers to engage the local community and stimulate the 
coproduction of public services. Public managers who get the most from partnerships learn with 
their partners, design proper institutional support for collaboration, and stick to their core 
responsibilities of providing high-quality public services.  
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For nonprofit managers, the important lesson is that they have to develop their leadership 
capacities in partnerships and they cannot wait for local governments to get everything ready. 
The value of nonprofits in public service provision is maximized when nonprofits lead, 
coordinate and actively participate in different phases of public service provision. It is also 
important for nonprofit organizations to realize the “publicness” of public services and the 
constraints associated with it. It is challenging to operate in a space which citizens and donors 
regard as a typical government function. Government-supporting nonprofits should therefore not 
define and limit their roles as a pure fundraising arm of local governments. Clear organizational 
identity for nonprofit organizations is essential for their success in this emerging field.    
 
For park professionals and park managers, they are facing an exciting but challenging time. On 
the one hand, there is unprecedented demand for urban green spaces and public spaces because 
of rapid urbanization, which represents opportunities for extensive development of this 
profession. On the other hand, the nature of public parks services is changing and it is no longer 
sufficient to rely on old tools and ideas for planning, managing, and financing parks. Those 
diverse operational models for public park management only make sense when park managers 
can fully assess the conditions, benefits, and costs of each model. For example, findings of this 
dissertation suggest that charitable support for public services may come at the expense of 
reduced public funding for parks and recreation services. Successful park managers bring people 
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together and create platforms for citizens from different sectors to co-create parks and recreation 
services that benefit the whole community.        
 
This dissertation contributes to public management scholarship by presenting new theories and 
evidence of nonprofit support for public services. It challenges the assumptions of existing 
research on government-nonprofit relationships, and aims to open a window for future research 
that contributes to both the theory and practice of public and nonprofit management. The 
increase in permanent, organized government-supporting charitable institutions challenges 
traditional notions that this funding is incidental and unimportant to the quality and distribution 
of public service provision, and suggests that public managers need to manage and adapt to this 
new level of engagement of nonprofit organizations to ensure the quality of public services. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
110 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Agranoff, R. (2007). Managing within networks: Adding value to public organizations. 
Georgetown University Press. 
Agranoff, R. (2012). Collaborating to manage: A primer for the public sector. Georgetown 
University Press. 
Agranoff, R., & McGuire, M. (2001). Big questions in public network management 
research. Journal of public administration research and theory,11(3), 295-326. 
Agranoff, R., & McGuire, M. (2004). Collaborative public management: New strategies for 
local governments. Georgetown University Press. 
Agranoff, R., & Radin, B. A. (1991). The comparative case study approach in public 
administration. In J. L. Perry (Ed.), Research in public administration (Vol. 1, pp. 203-
231). Greenwich, CT: JAI. 
Aligica, P. D., & Boettke, P. J. (2009). Challenging institutional analysis and development: The 
Bloomington school. Routledge. 
Angrist, J. D., Pischke, J. S., & Pischke, J. S. (2009). Mostly harmless econometrics: an 
empiricist's companion (Vol. 1). Princeton: Princeton University press. 
   
111 
 
Austin, J. E. (2000). Strategic collaboration between nonprofits and business. Nonprofit and 
voluntary sector quarterly, 29(suppl 1), 69-97. 
Austin, J. E., & Seitanidi, M. M. (2012). Collaborative value creation: A review of partnering 
between nonprofits and businesses. Value creation spectrum and collaboration 
stages. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 0899764012450777.  
Bahl, R. W. (1969). Metropolitan city expenditures: A comparative analysis. University Press of 
Kentucky. 
Bekkers, R., & Wiepking, P. (2011). A literature review of empirical studies of philanthropy: 
Eight mechanisms that drive charitable giving. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector 
Quarterly, 40(5), 924-973. 
Brandsen, T., & Honingh, M. (2015). Distinguishing different types of coproduction: A 
conceptual analysis based on the classical definitions. Public Administration Review. 
Brandsen, T., & Pestoff, V. (2006). Co-production, the third sector and the delivery of public 
services: An introduction. Public management review, 8(4), 493-501. 
Brinkerhoff, J. M. (2002). Government–nonprofit partnership: a defining framework. Public 
administration and development, 22(1), 19-30. 
Brooks, A. C. (2000). Public subsidies and charitable giving: Crowding out, crowding in, or 
both?. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 19(3), 451-464. 
   
112 
 
Brooks, A. C. (2000). Is There a Dark Side to Government Support for Nonprofits? Public 
Administration Review, 60(3), 211-218. 
Bryson, J. M., Crosby, B. C., & Stone, M. M. (2006). The design and implementation of cross-
sector collaborations: propositions from the literature. Public administration 
review, 66(s1), 44-55. 
Bovaird, T., Van Ryzin, G. G., Loeffler, E., & Parrado, S. (2015). Activating citizens to 
participate in collective co-production of public services. Journal of Social Policy, 44(01), 
1-23. 
Brudney, J. L., & England, R. E. (1983). Toward a definition of the coproduction concept. Public 
Administration Review, 59-65. 
Buchanan, J. M., & Tullock, G. (1962). The calculus of consent (Vol. 3). Ann Arbor: University 
of Michigan Press. 
Cheng, Y. (2016). The Impact of Nonprofits on Government Expenditure: Evidence from Local 
Parks and Recreation Services. Paper presented at the Association for Nonprofit and 
Voluntary Sector Conference, Washington, D.C. USA.   
Child, C. D., & Grønbjerg, K. A. (2007). Nonprofit advocacy organizations: Their characteristics 
and activities. Social Science Quarterly, 88(1), 259-281. 
Cornforth, C., & Brown, W. A. (2013). Nonprofit governance: Innovative perspectives and 
approaches. Routledge. 
   
113 
 
Cox, M., Arnold, G., & Tomás, S. V. 2010. A review of design principles for community-based 
natural resource management. Ecology and Society. 15(4): 38. [online] URL: 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol15/iss4/art38/ 
Crompton, J. L. (1999). Financing and acquiring park and recreation resources. Human 
Kinetics. 
Crompton, J. L. (2008). Empirical evidence of the contributions of park and conservation lands 
to environmental sustainability: The key to repositioning the parks field. World Leisure 
Journal, 50(3), 154-172. 
Dehejia, R. H., & Wahba, S. (1999). Causal effects in nonexperimental studies: Reevaluating the 
evaluation of training programs. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 94(448), 
1053-1062. 
Denhardt, R. B., & Denhardt, J. V. (2000). The new public service: Serving rather than 
steering. Public administration review, 60(6), 549-559. 
Denhardt, J. V., & Denhardt, R. B. (2015). The new public service revisited. Public 
Administration Review, 75(5), 664-672. 
Ferris, J. M. (1984). Coprovision: Citizen time and money donations in public service 
provision. Public Administration Review, 324-333. 
   
114 
 
Fischer, R. L., Wilsker, A., & Young, D. R. (2011). Exploring the revenue mix of nonprofit 
organizations: Does it relate to publicness?. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector 
Quarterly, 40(4), 662-681. 
Foster, M.K., & Meinhard, A.G. (2002). A regression model explaining predisposition to 
collaborate. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 31(4), 549–564. 
Foster, S. (2011). Collective action and the urban commons. Notre Dame Law Review, 87, 57. 
Fyall, R. (2016). The Power of Nonprofits: Mechanisms for Nonprofit Policy Influence. Public 
Administration Review, 76(6), 938-948. 
Gazley, B. (2010). Why not partner with local government? Nonprofit managerial perceptions of 
collaborative disadvantage. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 39(1), 51-76. 
Gazley, B. (2008). Beyond the contract: The scope and nature of informal government–nonprofit 
partnerships. Public administration review, 68(1), 141-154. 
Gazley, B., & Brudney, J. L. (2007). The purpose (and perils) of government-nonprofit 
partnership. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 36(3), 389-415. 
Gazley, B., & Cheng, Y. D., & LaFontant, C. (2015). Coproduction of public services: Recent 
trends and taxonomy of philanthropic support for public parks and recreation. Paper 
presented at the Association for Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Conference, Chicago, 
USA.   
   
115 
 
Gazley, B., & Guo, C. (2015). What do we know about nonprofit collaboration? A 
comprehensive systematic review of the literature. In Academy of Management 
Proceedings (Vol. 2015, No. 1, p. 15409). Academy of Management. 
George, A. L., & Bennett, A. (2005). Case studies and theory development in the social sciences. 
MIT Press. 
Gerring, J. (2006). Case study research: Principles and practices. Cambridge University Press. 
Goldsmith, S., & Eggers, W. D. (2005). Governing by network: The new shape of the public 
sector. Brookings Institution Press. 
Graddy, E. A., & Chen, B. (2006). Influences on the size and scope of networks for social 
service delivery. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 16(4), 533-552. 
Gray, B. (1989). Collaborating: Finding Common Ground for Multiparty Problems. Jossey-Bass, 
San Francisco, CA. 
Grønbjerg, K. A. (1993). Understanding nonprofit funding: Managing revenues in social 
services and community development organizations. Jossey-Bass Inc Pub. 
Grønbjerg, K. A., & Paarlberg, L. (2001). Community variations in the size and scope of the 
nonprofit sector: Theory and preliminary findings. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector 
Quarterly, 30(4), 684-706. 
   
116 
 
Guo, C. (2007). When government becomes the principal philanthropist: The effects of public 
funding on patterns of nonprofit governance. Public administration review, 67(3), 458-
473. 
Guo, C., & Acar, M. (2005). Understanding collaboration among nonprofit organizations: 
Combining resource dependency, institutional, and network perspectives. Nonprofit and 
Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 34(3), 340-361. 
Guo, C., & Saxton, G. D. (2014). Tweeting social change: How social media are changing 
nonprofit advocacy. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 43(1), 57-79. 
Guo, C., & Zhang, Z. (2014). Understanding nonprofit advocacy in non-western settings: A 
framework and empirical evidence from Singapore. VOLUNTAS: International Journal 
of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 25(5), 1151-1174. 
Hannan, M. T., & Freeman, J. (1977). The population ecology of organizations. American 
journal of sociology, 82(5), 929-964. 
Hansmann, H. (1987). Economic theories of nonprofit organizations. The nonprofit sector: 
research handbook, 27-42. 
Harnik, P. (2006). The Excellent City Park System. The Trust for Public Land.   
Harnik, P. (2012). Urban Green: Innovative Parks for Resurgent Cities. Island Press. 
Harnik, P. & Martin, A. (2015). Public spaces/private money: the triumphs and pitfalls of urban 
park conservancies. The Trust for Public Land. 
   
117 
 
Herranz, J. (2008). The multisectoral trilemma of network management. Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory, 18(1), 1-31. 
Herranz, J. (2010). Network Performance and Coordination: A Theoretical Review and 
Framework. Public Performance & Management Review, 33(3), 311-341 
Irvin, Renee A., and Patrick Carr. (2005). The Role of Philanthropy in Local Government 
Finance. Public Budgeting & Finance,  25(3):33-47. 
Kaczynski, A. T., & Crompton, J. L. (2006). Financing Priorities in Local Governments: Where 
Do Park and Recreation Services Rank? Journal of Park and Recreation 
Administration, 24(1), 84-103. 
Kania, J., & Kramer, M. (2011). Collective impact. Stanford Social Innovation Review.  
Keele, L., & Kelly, N. J. (2006). Dynamic models for dynamic theories: The ins and outs of 
lagged dependent variables. Political analysis, 14(2), 186-205. 
Kettl, D.F. (2002). Chapter 16: Managing Indirect Government. In The Tools of Government: A 
Guide to the New Governance, edited by Lester Salamon. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 490-510. 
Klijn, E. H. (2012). New public management and governance: A comparison. Oxford Handbook 
of Governance, 201-214. 
   
118 
 
Lecy, J. D., & Van Slyke, D. M. (2013). Nonprofit sector growth and density: Testing theories of 
government support. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 23(1), 189-
214. 
Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. (2017). Fiscally Standardized Cities database. 
http://www.lincolninst.edu/subcenters/fiscally-standardized-cities/. Accessed on: June 17, 
2017. 
Malatesta, D., & Smith, C. R. (2014). Lessons from resource dependence theory for 
contemporary public and nonprofit management. Public Administration Review, 74(1), 
14-25. 
McGinnis, M. D. (1999). Polycentric governance and development: Readings from the workshop 
in political theory and policy analysis. University of Michigan Press. 
McGinnis, M. D. (2016). Polycentric Governance in Theory and Practice: Dimensions of 
Aspiration and Practical Limitations. Working Paper. 
McGuire, M. (2006). Collaborative public management: Assessing what we know and how we 
know it. Public administration review, 66(s1), 33-43. 
McGuire, M., & Agranoff, R. (2011). Networking in the Shadow of Bureaucracy. In R. Durant 
(Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of American Bureaucracy (pp. 372–395). Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
   
119 
 
Meier, K. J. (1993). Latinos and representative bureaucracy testing the Thompson and 
Henderson hypotheses. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 3(4), 
393-414. 
Milward, H. B., & Provan, K. G. (1993). 10. The Hollow State: Private Provision of Public 
Services. Public policy for democracy, 222. 
Milward, H. B., & Provan, K. G. (2000). Governing the hollow state. Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory, 10(2), 359-380. 
Minkoff, D. C. (2002). The emergence of hybrid organizational forms: Combining identity-based 
service provision and political action. Nonprofit and voluntary sector quarterly, 31(3), 
377-401. 
Moore, E. A., & Koontz, T. M. (2003). Research note a typology of collaborative watershed 
groups: citizen-based, agency-based, and mixed partnerships. Society &Natural 
Resources, 16(5), 451-460. 
Mosley, J. E. (2010). Organizational resources and environmental incentives: Understanding the 
policy advocacy involvement of human service nonprofits. Social Service Review, 84(1), 
57-76. 
Mosley, J. E. (2012). Keeping the lights on: How government funding concerns drive the 
advocacy agendas of nonprofit homeless service providers. Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory, 22(4), 841-866. 
   
120 
 
Mowen, A. J., Graefe, A. R., Barrett, A. G., & Godbey, G. C. (2016). Americans’ Use and 
Perceptions of Local Recreation and Park Services: A Nationwide Reassessment. 
National Recreation and Park Association.  
Murray, M. F. (2010). Private management of public spaces: Nonprofit organizations and urban 
parks. Harvard Environmental Law Review, 34, 179. 
Nabatchi, T., Sancino, A., & Sicilia, M. (2017). Varieties of Participation in Public Services: The 
Who, When, and What of Coproduction. Public Administration Review. 
Nelson, A. and Gazley, B. (2014). The rise of school-supporting nonprofits. Education Finance 
and Policy, 9(4), 541-566. 
Nickell, S. (1981). Biases in dynamic models with fixed effects. Econometrica: Journal of the 
Econometric Society, 1417-1426. 
Oliver, P., Marwell, G., & Teixeira, R. (1985). A theory of the critical mass. I. Interdependence, 
group heterogeneity, and the production of collective action. American journal of 
Sociology, 522-556. 
Osborne, D., & Gaebler, T. (1992). Reinventing government: How the entrepreneurial spirit is 
transforming government. Reading Mass. Addison Wesley Public Comp. 
   
121 
 
Osborne, S. P., & McLaughlin, K. (2004). The cross-cutting review of the voluntary sector: 
where next for local government–voluntary sector relationships?. Regional studies, 38(5), 
571-580. 
Osborne, S. P., & Strokosch, K. (2013). It takes two to tango? understanding the Co‐production 
of public services by integrating the services management and public administration 
perspectives. British Journal of Management, 24(S1), S31-S47. 
Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action. 
Cambridge university press. 
Ostrom, E. (2005). Understanding institutional diversity (Vol. 241). Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
Ostrom, V. (1972). Polycentricity (part 1). In Polycentricity and local public economies: 
readings from the workshop in political theory and policy analysis (pp. 119-138). 
University of Michigan Press. 
Ostrom, V., & Ostrom, E. (1977). Public goods and public choices.  In Alternatives for 
Delivering Public Services: Toward Improved Performance, ed. Emanuel S. Savas, 7–49. 
Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
Ostrom, V., Tiebout, C. M., & Warren, R. (1961). The organization of government in 
metropolitan areas: a theoretical inquiry. American political science review, 55(04), 831-
842. 
   
122 
 
O'Toole Jr, L. J. (1997). Treating networks seriously: Practical and research-based agendas in 
public administration. Public administration review, 45-52. 
Paarlberg, L. E., & Gen, S. (2009). Exploring the determinants of nonprofit coproduction of 
public service delivery: The case of K-12 public education. The American Review of 
Public Administration, 39(4), 391-408. 
Paarlberg, L. E., & Yoshioka, T. (2016). The Impact of Local Economic Structure on 
Community Philanthropy. Public Administration Review, 76: 340–350.  
Parks, R. B., Baker, P. C., Kiser, L., Oakerson, R., Ostrom, E., Ostrom, V., ... & Wilson, R. 
(1981). Consumers as coproducers of public services: Some economic and institutional 
considerations. Policy Studies Journal, 9(7), 1001-1011. 
Payne, L. L., Mowen, A. J., & Orsega-Smith, E. (2002). An examination of park preferences and 
behaviors among urban residents: the role of residential location, race, and age. Leisure 
sciences, 24(2), 181-198. 
Peters, B. G. (1998). ‘With a little help from our friends’: public-private partnerships as 
institutions and instruments. In Partnerships in urban governance (pp. 11-33). Palgrave 
Macmillan UK. 
Pincetl, S. (2003). Nonprofits and park provision in Los Angeles: An exploration of the rise of 
governance approaches to the provision of local services. Social Science Quarterly, 84(4), 
979-1001. 
   
123 
 
Raftery, A. E. (1996). Approximate Bayes factors and accounting for model uncertainty in 
generalized linear models. Biometrika, 83(2), 251-266. 
Rhodes, R. A. W. (1996). The new governance: governing without government1. Political 
studies, 44(4), 652-667. 
Provan, K. G., & Kenis, P. (2008). Modes of network governance: Structure, management, and 
effectiveness. Journal of public administration research and theory, 18(2), 229-252. 
Rosenzweig, R., & Blackmar, E. (1992). The park and the people: a history of Central Park. 
Cornell University Press. 
Rupasingha, A., & Goetz, S. J. (2008). US county-level social capital data, 1990-2005. The 
northeast regional center for rural development, Penn State University, University Park, 
PA. 
Saidel, J. R. (1989). Dimensions of interdependence: The state and voluntary-sector 
relationship. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly,18(4), 335-347. 
Salamon, L. M. (1986). Government and the voluntary sector in an era of retrenchment: the 
American experience. Journal of Public Policy, 6(01), 1-19. 
Salamon, L. M. (1987). Of Market Failure, Voluntary Failure, and Third-Party Government: 
Toward a Theory of Government-Nonprofit Relations in the Modern Welfare State. 
Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 16(1):29-49. 
   
124 
 
Saidel, J. R. (1989). Dimensions of interdependence: The state and voluntary-sector 
relationship. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly,18(4), 335-347. 
Salamon, L. M. (Ed.). (2002). The tools of government: A guide to the new governance. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Skidmore, M., & Scorsone, E. (2011). Causes and consequences of fiscal stress in Michigan 
cities. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 41(4), 360-371. 
Smith, S.R., and Grønbjerg, K.A. (2006). Scope and theory of government-nonprofit relations. In 
Powell, W.W. and Steinberg, R. (Eds.), The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook (pp. 
221-242). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Smith, S. R., & Lipsky, M. (1993). Nonprofits for hire: The welfare state in the age of 
contracting. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Snijders, T. A. B., & Bosker, R. J. (2012). Multilevel analysis: An introduction to basic and 
advanced multilevel modeling. Los Angeles: Sage. 
StataCorp. 2013. Stata 13 Base Reference Manual. College Station, TX: Stata Press. 
http://www.stata.com/manuals13/rtetrachoric.pdf  
Steinberg, R. (2006). Economic theories of nonprofit organizations. In Powell, W.W. and 
Steinberg, R. (Eds.), The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook (pp. 117-139). New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
   
125 
 
Stone, M. M., Crosby, B. C., & Bryson, J. M. (2010). Governing public–nonprofit collaborations: 
understanding their complexity and the implications for research. Voluntary Sector 
Review, 1(3), 309-334. 
Strauss, A., & Corbin, J. (1990). Basics of Qualitative Research: Grounded Theory Procedures 
and Techniques. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications. 
Tsukamoto, I., & Nishimura, M. (2006). The emergence of local non-profit–government 
partnerships and the role of intermediary organizations in Japan: Contractual 
relationships and the limits to co-governance. Public management review, 8(4), 567-581. 
U.S. Bureau of the Census. (2006). Government Finance and Employment Classification Manual. 
http://www2.census.gov/govs/pubs/classification/2006_classification_manual.pdf  
Urban Studies Institute. (2014). Louisville’s Peer Cities Revisited. Retrieved from 
http://usi.louisville.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Final-Version-Peer-Cities-
Report.pdf 
Van Slyke, D. M. (2007). Agents or stewards: Using theory to understand the government-
nonprofit social service contracting relationship. Journal of Public Administration 
Research and Theory, 17(2), 157-187. 
Vangen, S., Hayes, J. P., & Cornforth, C. (2015). Governing cross-sector, inter-organizational 
collaborations. Public Management Review, 17(9), 1237-1260. 
   
126 
 
Verschuere, B., Brandsen, T., & Pestoff, V. (2012). Co-production: The state of the art in 
research and the future agenda. Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and 
Nonprofit Organizations, 23(4), 1083-1101. 
Voorberg, W. H., Bekkers, V. J., & Tummers, L. G. (2015). A systematic review of co-creation 
and co-production: Embarking on the social innovation journey. Public Management 
Review, 17(9), 1333-1357. 
Walls, M. (2014). Private Funding Public Parks. Resources for the Future.  
Walls, M. M., Darley, S., & Siikamäki, J. (2009). The State of the Great Outdoors: America's 
Parks, Public Lands, and Recreation Resources. Resources for the Future.  
Weisbrod, B. A. (1975). Toward a theory of the voluntary non-profit sector in a three-sector 
economy. 
Weisbrod B. (1988). The nonprofit economy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Weisbrod, B. A. (2000). To profit or not to profit: The commercial transformation of the 
nonprofit sector. Cambridge University Press. 
Wilsker, A. L., & Young, D. R. (2010). How does program composition affect the revenues of 
nonprofit organizations? Investigating a benefits theory of nonprofit finance. Public 
Finance Review, 38(2), 193-216. 
   
127 
 
Wolpert, J. (1977). Social income and the voluntary sector. Papers in Regional Science, 39(1), 
217-229. 
Wooldridge, J. M. (2006). Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach. Thomson South-
Western.  
Yandle, T., Noonan, D. S., & Gazley, B. (2016). Philanthropic Support of National Parks 
Analysis Using the Social-Ecological Systems Framework. Nonprofit and Voluntary 
Sector Quarterly, 0899764016643612. 
Young, D. R. (2000). Alternative models of government-nonprofit sector relations: theoretical 
and international perspectives. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 29(1), 149-172. 
Young, D. R. (2007). Toward a normative theory of nonprofit finance. Financing nonprofits: 
Putting theory into practice, 339-72.  
Zhu, L. (2013). Panel data analysis in public administration: Substantive and statistical 
considerations. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 23(2), 395-428.
   
128 
 
APPENDIX: INFORMED CONSENT STATEMENT 
 
       Study #1703714120 
 
INDIANA UNIVERSITY – BLOOMINGTON 
INFORMED CONSENT STATEMENT 
 
 
A Comparative Case Study of Local Government-Nonprofit Partnerships for Parks 
 
You are invited to participate in a research study of local government-nonprofit partnerships for 
city parks. You were selected as a possible subject because you are a public or nonprofit 
manager who takes key leadership roles in the parks department or a park-supporting nonprofit 
organization. Please read this form and ask any question you may have before agreeing to be in 
the study. 
 
The study is being conducted by Indiana University Ph.D. candidate Daniel Cheng, with the 
support and supervision of SPEA-IUB Professor Beth Gazley.   
 
 
STUDY PURPOSE:   
The purpose of this study is to understand why different forms of government-nonprofit 
partnerships emerge, how they are governed in different ways, and how they are linked to the 
performance of city park systems. This is a new but important area of research in public and 
nonprofit management, and the results will be of interest to both scholars, citizens, nonprofit 
managers, and government officials.  
 
 
NUMBER OF PEOPLE TAKING PART IN THE STUDY 
You are part of a small group (15-20) of participants who will be interviewed in the region of the 
Ohio River Basin. The Ohio River Basin is selected because major cities in this region are 
usually regarded as peer cities in terms of their social and economic development. However, the 
characteristics of their park systems and the forms of their government-nonprofit partnerships for 
parks vary significantly. Interviewees include both public and nonprofit managers. You will be 
interviewed in person or by telephone for approximately 30 minutes to one hour. A brief follow-
up by telephone or email to clarify meaning may be possible.  
 
 
RISKS OF TAKING PART IN THE STUDY 
While on the study, the risks are: 
A risk of feeling uncomfortable in the semi-structured interview. 
A risk of possible loss of confidentiality.  
A risk of reliving a past conflict.  
A risk of pressure to alter responses because of social pressures or the requirement of 
your current position. 
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While participating in the individual interview, you can tell the researcher that you feel 
uncomfortable and do not want to answer a particular question.  
 
 
 
BENEFITS OF TAKING PART IN THE STUDY 
 
The benefits of participation that are reasonable to expect are being fundamental to the 
development of new knowledge about how government-nonprofit partnerships are managed and 
governed, especially among their peer cities. The participant will also have free access to a free 
executive summary of the results.   
 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY:    
Your interview will be audiotaped. The interviews are confidential. Audiotapes will be destroyed 
once they have been transcribed, and transcriptions will be edited to delete all personal data and 
identifying information. Only the city of origin will be kept and used internally to allow 
interviews from the same city to be matched and compared.  These findings may be published.  
No participant will be identified in any publication.   
  
  
PAYMENT 
You will not receive payment for taking part in this study. 
 
 
CONTACT: 
If you have questions at any time about the study or the procedures, (or you experience adverse 
effects as a result of participating in this study) you may contact the researcher, Daniel Cheng, at 
Indiana University at 317-252-3347 and chengyua@indiana.edu.  If you feel you have not been 
treated according to the descriptions in this form, or your rights as a participant in research have 
been violated during the course of this project, you may contact the Indiana University Human 
Subjects Office at 812-856-4242 or by email at IRB@IU.edu and reference IRB Protocol 
#1703714120. 
 
 
PARTICIPATION:   
Your participation in this study is voluntary; you may refuse to participate without penalty.  If 
you decide to participate, you may withdraw from the study at any time without penalty and 
without loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.  If you withdraw from the study 
before data collection is completed your data will be returned to you or destroyed. 
 
I have read this form and received a copy of it.  I have had all my questions answered to my 
satisfaction.  I agree to take part in this study. 
 
Subject's signature___________________________________ Date _________________ 
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APPENDIX: INTERVIEW DISCUSSION GUIDE 
 
Interview Protocol for in-person and telephone interviews: 
 
Note:  the following is indicative of the questions that will be asked of interview participants.  It 
will give you a good idea of the scope and focus of the interview in terms of information that 
will be sought.  However, the exact wording of questions will be guided by the individual 
circumstances of each interview. 
 
I am now going to turn on the tape recorder…. 
 
Option A or B: 
(A). We are in the city of ______, speaking with _________(Name/Title) 
(B). I am speaking by phone with ____________________ (Name/Title) of _____ (City Name) 
 
Mr./Ms. ____________.  Thanks again for agreeing to participate in this interview.   
 
(A) Here is an “Informed Consent Statement” that you can keep and 
(B) You have already received an informed consent statement  
 
that describes the purpose of this study, how information will be used, your rights as a 
participant, and how I can be contacted.  Let me know at any time if you would like more 
information about the study and its outcomes. 
 
[For those interviewees with an active government-nonprofit partnership – Indianapolis, 
Louisville, Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Nashville]: 
 
1. Can you talk about how governments and nonprofits develop into this partnership and 
how this partnership evolves over time? What are some of the benefits and costs you have 
experienced in this partnership? Is there any benefit or cost/challenge that you did not 
expect when entering this partnership?  
 
2. What role does the parks department/nonprofit play in this partnership? Based on your 
experiences, is it the city or the nonprofit that takes the leadership role in this 
partnership? Through which mechanisms do the parks department and the nonprofit 
figure out their roles (e.g. formal agreement, informal dialogues, or one party divides the 
responsibilities)?   
 
3. In addition to the parks department and the nonprofit, are there other partner 
organizations involved in the partnership? Is any higher level public official (e.g. 
mayor/city manager/city council members) involved in the partnership? What roles are 
they playing? 
 
4. Is there a formal agreement signed between XX nonprofit and the city parks department?  
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[if yes] What is that agreement mainly about? How was this agreement drafted? How do 
you make sure that both parties follow the terms of the agreement? Who monitors the 
process? What are the consequences of not following the terms of the agreement?  
 
[if no] Why not? How do you make sure that each party would fulfill their expected 
responsibilities? How were these informal rules or agreements? Do you see the need for a 
formal agreement for the partnership to go forward?   
 
5. How often do you meet the staffs or directors of XX nonprofit/city parks director? Is this 
usually a formal or informal meeting? What are those meetings usually about? Are these 
meetings more focused on specific issues or symbolic?  
 
6. [If government] Do you sit on the board or advisory council of XX nonprofit? If so, what 
role do you play on the board? If not, why not? Is that because they did not invite you or 
you did not want to serve on the board? What do you think are the risks and benefits of 
sitting on the board of the nonprofits?   
 
[If nonprofit] Does the parks director sit on the board or advisory council of XX 
nonprofit? If so, what roles are they filling? If not, why not? What do you think are the 
risks and benefits of inviting city parks director to sit on the board of the nonprofits?   
 
7. In the last few years, have you encountered situations in which you have to turn down a 
nonprofit/the city’s request in park programming or planning, or any conflict with the 
parks department/nonprofit? If so, can you briefly describe the incident? How did you 
finally reach the agreement? 
 
8. [If government] In the city council/park board meeting, have you ever encountered 
challenges of cutting parks spending or other issues because of the resources nonprofit 
bring to the table? How did you address such challenges?  
 
[If nonprofit] In the board meeting or meeting with the donors, have you ever 
encountered challenges of reducing donations because of the partnership with city 
government? How did you address such challenges and concerns of the donors? 
 
9. What would you want others to know about how these intersectoral partnerships work or 
don’t work?  Reflecting on this partnership, what lessons would you want to pass along to 
other public and nonprofit managers? Of the following factors, which is the most 
important barrier or concern for you in developing such a partnership: resource 
insufficiency, equity (partnerships are more likely to be developed in richer areas), 
accountability (which parties are responsible for the performance of the partnerships), 
effectiveness (measuring how effective those partnerships truly are), power imbalances 
(governments and nonprofits are in different power positions in the partnership), or 
something else? Can you elaborate?   
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10. Among your peer cities, many of them have developed active government-nonprofit 
partnerships for parks. Are you aware of any of these partnerships? Which city do you 
think has developed the best public-nonprofit partnerships for parks? What is the most 
important thing you want to learn from them?  
[For those interviewees without an active government-nonprofit partnership – Columbus]: 
 
1. According to the information I have accessed through online research, it seems like your 
city has not developed a partnership with nonprofits for city parks. Am I correct? Were 
you in such partnerships before?  
 
2. [If no] Why do you think that the local government and nonprofit organizations do not 
partner in your community?  What factors contribute to there being no such government-
nonprofit partnerships in your community? Have you received any active request from 
citizens or nonprofits to develop such partnerships? If so, why did you decline the 
request? [Probe if necessary with a check-list of possible/likely factors].  
 
3. [If yes] What caused this partnership to end?  [Probe if necessary:] Were your goals 
achieved?  If not, what happened and why do you think it happened the way it did? 
 
4. What are some of the mechanisms for your department to gather citizen input and raise 
private support for parks?  
 
5. Given the current situation of your city parks system, is the parks department actively 
seeking such partnerships with nonprofits? If so, what are the opportunities and 
challenges you have observed in the process? Of the following factors, which is the most 
important barrier or concern for you in developing such a partnership: resource 
insufficiency, equity (partnerships are more likely to be developed in richer areas), 
accountability (which parties are responsible for the performance of the partnerships), 
effectiveness (measuring how effective those partnerships truly are), power imbalances 
(governments and nonprofits are in different power positions in the partnership), or 
something else? Can you elaborate?   
 
6. Among your peer cities, many of them have developed active government-nonprofit 
partnerships for parks. Are you aware of any of these partnerships? Which city do you 
think has developed the best public-nonprofit partnerships for parks? What is the most 
important thing you want to learn from them?  
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APPENDIX: EMAIL INVITATION 
 
Email Invitation (First Round):  
Dear Mr./Ms.＊＊:  
 
You are invited to participate in a research study of local government-nonprofit partnerships for 
city parks. The purpose of this study is to understand why different forms of government-
nonprofit partnerships emerge and how they are governed and managed. This is a new but 
important area of research in public and nonprofit management, and the results will be of interest 
to scholars, citizens, nonprofit managers, and government officials like yourself. 
 
You were selected for this interview as part of a small group (20-25) of participants, who takes 
leadership roles in managing government-nonprofit partnerships in major cities of the Ohio River 
Basin region. Your participation is therefore very important to our ability to achieve a 
comprehensive understanding of how such partnerships are governed and managed. By 
participating in this study, you will not only contribute to the common knowledge of this 
important topic, but also gain knowledge about how your peer cities are doing in managing these 
public-nonprofit partnerships.  
 
The interview will take 30 to 60 minutes to complete. Interview questions range from the general 
assessment of the partnership to the specific role you play and the challenges you have 
encountered in the partnership. The attached informed consent statement contains more detailed 
information about the risks, benefits, and procedures of this study. If you have any question or 
concern, please call me at 317-252-3347 or email me at chengyua@indiana.edu.  
 
If you are willing to accept this interview invitation and participate in this study, I would like to 
identify a date and time in the next two weeks to carry out the interview. I can conduct the 
interview in person or through the phone per your convenience. Thank you for your 
consideration and I look forward to hearing from you.   
 
Sincerely, 
 
Daniel Cheng 
School of Public and Environmental Affairs at Indiana University Bloomington 
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Email Invitation (Second Round):  
Dear Mr./Ms.＊＊:  
 
I am writing to follow up on a previous email sent to you [last week/recently] in which you were 
invited to participate in a study about local government-nonprofit partnerships for parks. Just to 
refresh your memory, I conduct research on government-nonprofit partnerships for parks. You 
were selected for this interview for important representational reasons and you are part of a small 
group (20-25) of participants. Your participation is therefore very important to our ability to 
achieve a comprehensive understanding of how such partnerships are governed and managed. 
 
I am hoping that you can spare 30 to 60 minutes of your time for an interview at your office or 
on the phone during the coming month, to talk about government-nonprofit partnerships in your 
community. By participating in this study, you will not only contribute to the common 
knowledge of this important topic, but also gain knowledge about how your peer cities are doing 
to manage these public-nonprofit partnerships. As a thank you for participating in the study, I 
will send you a report. The attached informed consent statement contains more detailed 
information about the risks, benefits, and procedures of this study. 
 
If you are willing to accept this interview invitation and participate in this study, I would like to 
identify a date and time in the next two weeks to carry out the interview. I can conduct the 
interview in person or through the phone per your convenience. Thank you for your 
consideration and I look forward to hearing from you. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Daniel Cheng 
School of Public and Environmental Affairs at Indiana University-Bloomington 
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APPENDIX: PHONE SCRIPT 
 
Phone Script for Follow-up to Initial Letter and Scheduling of Interviews 
 
 
“Hello, Mr./Ms. ______________.  My name is Daniel Cheng from Indiana University.  I am 
calling to follow up on a letter sent to you [last week/recently] in which you were invited to 
participate in a study about local government-nonprofit partnerships for parks.”   
 
“Just to refresh your memory, I conducted research on government-nonprofit partnerships for 
parks. I am now interviewing a small group of public [nonprofit] managers in major cities in the 
Ohio River Basin region to examine why different forms of government-nonprofit partnerships 
emerge, how they are governed in different ways.  I am hoping that you can spare one hour of 
your time for an interview at your office during the coming month, to talk about government-
nonprofit partnerships in your community.”   
 
[Participant accepts or declines invitation] 
 
If a NO, “Thank you anyway for your time.  Have a great day.” 
 
If a YES, “That’s great.  Thanks so much for your time.  Would an interview on ___________ 
work for you?’  [Further unscripted conversation to schedule interviews will take place here]  
 
“Before we meet, you may also wish to review the initial letter I sent you, in which I described 
your rights as a study participant and the uses to which the data will be put.  I will also have a 
copy of that information with me when I arrive.” 
 
“May I have your email address now so that I can confirm our appointment shortly in advance?”   
 
“I look forward to meeting you.  Thanks again for your time.” 
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APPENDIX: THANK-YOU LETTER 
 
Letter #1 
 
May 1, 2017 
 
Dear ___________, 
 
Thank you most sincerely for your participation in the Indiana University project on local 
government-nonprofit partnerships for parks. I enjoyed our interview at your offices (or on the 
phone) very much, and the project has benefited considerably from your participation. I know 
how busy you are and thus am doubly grateful for your time and interest.   
 
As I mentioned, it will be some time before these findings make their way into print, but I will be 
sure to notify you when they do. 
 
With my deep appreciation, 
 
 
Daniel Cheng 
School of Public and Environmental Affairs  
Indiana University Bloomington 
 
 
 
Letter #2 
 
May 1, 2017 
 
Dear ___________, 
 
Thank you most sincerely for your interest in participating in the Indiana University project on 
local government-nonprofit partnerships for parks.  I am sorry our conflicting schedules did not 
permit me to visit your offices for an interview.  There may be an opportunity for telephone 
interviews at some future time, so if you hear from me it will be for the purposes of setting up a 
time to interview you by phone about government-nonprofit partnerships in your community.  I 
hope you will be able to oblige me.  In the meantime, please accept my thanks for your time and 
interest, and my best wishes for a successful year. 
 
With my deep appreciation, 
 
 
Daniel Cheng 
School of Public and Environmental Affairs  
Indiana University Bloomington
   
 
 
Yuan (Daniel) Cheng 
Email: chengyua@indiana.edu   
Personal Website: http://yuandanielcheng.weebly.com/  
 
EDUCATION 
 
Ph.D. Public Affairs, Indiana University Bloomington, 2013 - 2017                        
 Field: Nonprofit Management, Public Management, Environmental Policy 
 Committee: Beth Gazley (Chair), Daniel Cole, Burnell Fischer, Michael McGuire,  
Chao Guo (University of Pennsylvania) 
 
M.A. Philanthropic Studies, Indiana University–Purdue University Indianapolis, 2011 - 2013 
 
B.S. Environmental Science, Zhejiang University, China, 2006 - 2010 
              Morningside Cultural China Scholars Program, Chu Kochen Honors College 
              Exchange Student, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, 2008   
 
 
ACADEMIC POSITIONS 
 
Visiting Assistant Professor, Indiana University Bloomington, School of Public and 
Environmental Affairs, August 2017 - present  
 
 
RESEARCH 
 
Publications: 
Cheng, Y. “Nonprofit Spending and Government Provision of Public Services: Testing Theories 
of Government-Nonprofit Relationships.” R&R status at Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory.  
Cheng, Y., Yang, L. “How do Nonprofits Respond to Government Budget Cuts? Evidence from 
Local Parks and Recreation Services.” R&R status at Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector 
Quarterly.  
Gazley, B., Cheng, Y., and LaFontant, C. “Charitable Support for Public Parks and Recreation: 
Trends and Taxonomies.” R&R status at Public Administration Review. 
 
Working Papers:  
Cheng, Y. “Exploring the Role of Nonprofits in Public Service Provision: Shifting from         
Co-production to Co-governance.” 
Cheng, Y. “Governing Public-Nonprofit Partnerships: Linking Governance Mechanisms to 
Collaboration Stages.” 
Cheng, Y., Shi, Y., Andrew, S. “Does a Polycentric System of Governance Perform Better? 
Evidence from Large U.S. City Park Systems.” 
   
 
Farmer, J., Cheng, Y., Dickinson, S., Robeson S., Reynolds, H., Fischer, B. “U.S. Municipal 
Park and Recreation Departments Ill-Prepared for Changing Climate While Adverse 
Events Spawn Adaptation.” 
Gazley, B., Cheng, Y., and LaFontant, C. “Private Provision of Public Services through the Lens 
of Social Justice: How Equitable Are They?”  
 
Funded Grants:  
“Does a Polycentric System of Governance Perform Better? Evidence from Large U.S. City Park 
Systems.” The Vincent and Elinor Ostrom Workshop at Indiana University 
Bloomington, Principal Investigator. 2017-2018  
“Is Charitable Support for U.S. Public Parks Good Public Policy or a Philanthropic Failure?” 
Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy Research Fund, Co-Principal 
Investigator. 2016-2017  
 
Conference and Research Presentations:  
“Nonprofit Spending and Government Provision of Public Services: Testing Theories of 
Government-Nonprofit Relationships.” August 2017. The 77th Annual Meeting of the 
Academy of Management. Atlanta, GA.  
“How Do Nonprofits Respond to Government Budget Cuts? Evidence from Local Parks and 
Recreation Services.” With Kate Lang Yang. June 2017. Public Management Research 
Conference. Washington, D.C.   
“Understanding Nonprofit Support for Public Services: From Co-production to Co-governance.” 
June 2017. Public Management Research Conference. Washington, D.C.   
 “Understanding Nonprofit Support for Public Services: From Co-production to Co-governance.” 
May 2017. Third Annual Duck Family Graduate Workshop in Environmental Politics 
and Governance. Seattle, WA.  
“U.S. Municipal Park and Recreation Departments Ill-Prepared for Changing Climate While 
Adverse Events Spawn Adaptation.” April 2017. Workshop on Adapting to Climate 
Change. Notre Dame, IN.  
“The Impact of Nonprofits on Government Expenditure: Evidence from Local Parks and 
Recreation Services.” November 2016. Association for Research on Nonprofit 
Organizations and Voluntary Action Annual Conference. Washington, D.C. 
“The Impact of Nonprofits on Government Expenditure: Evidence from Local Parks and 
Recreation Services.” November 2016. Association for Public Policy Analysis and 
Management Annual Conference. Washington, D.C. 
“Local Governments Collaborate with Nonprofits in City Park Management: An Exploratory 
Analysis.” March 2016. American Society for Public Administration Annual 
Conference. Seattle, WA. 
“Philanthropic Support for Public Parks and Recreation: Trends and Taxonomies.” with Beth 
Gazley and Chantalle LaFontant. November 2015. Association for Research on 
Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Action Annual Conference. Chicago, IL.  
“Coproduction of Public Services: Recent Trends and Taxonomy of Philanthropic Support for 
Public Parks and Recreation.” with Beth Gazley. June 2015. Public Management 
Research Association Conference. Minneapolis, MN.  
   
 
“Coproduction of Public Services: Recent Trends and Taxonomy of Philanthropic Support for 
Public Parks and Recreation.” with Beth Gazley. May 2015. Social Innovation Research 
Conference. Shanghai, China.  
 
Additional Training:  
AOM Public and Nonprofit Division Doctoral Student Professional Development Consortium, 
Atlanta, August 2017 
ICPSR Summer Program in Quantitative Methods, University of Michigan, July 2016 
Summer Institute for Qualitative and Multi-Method Research, Syracuse University, June 2015 
PMRC Doctoral Student Professional Development Workshop, Minnesota, June 2015 
 
Research Skills: 
Multilevel analysis; causal inference; longitudinal data analysis; categorical data analysis; 
structural equation modeling; network analysis 
Survey research methods and online questionnaire design  
Qualitative analysis using Nvivo 
Geographic information system 
Institutional Analysis 
 
 
TEACHING 
 
Teaching Interests: 
Nonprofit Management and Leadership, Cross-sectoral Collaboration, Community Organizing, 
Social Entrepreneurship, Local Public Management, Urban Sustainability 
 
Teaching Experience:  
Instructor: Nonprofit Management and Leadership. Indiana University School of Public and 
Environmental Affairs. 2015 – 2016, 2017 – 2018. 
Teaching Fellow: Leadership, Organizing and Action: Leading Change. Harvard SEED for 
Social Innovation. Summer 2016. 
Guest Lecturer: Environment and People, Human Resource Management in the Public Sector, 
Nonprofit Management and Leadership. Indiana University School of Public and 
Environmental Affairs. Spring 2016. 
 
 
HONORS and AWARDS 
 
Ostrom Research Award, Indiana University Bloomington, 2017 
Penn Summer Doctoral Fellowship, University of Pennsylvania, 2017 
Pi Alpha Alpha Global Honor Society for Public Affairs and Administration, 2016 
ARNOVA Doctoral Fellowship Award, 2016 
ARNOVA Emerging Scholars Research Roundtable, 2016  
Summer Fellowship for ICPSR Quantitative Methods Training, Indiana University, 2016 
Institute for Humane Studies PhD Scholarship, George Mason University, 2015-2016 
Summer Fellowship for IQMR Qualitative Methods Training, Indiana University, 2015 
   
 
Best Paper Award in Nonprofit Management, SPEA Doctoral Student Conference, 2015 
Adam Smith Fellowship, Mercatus Center, George Mason University, 2014-2015 
Indiana State Resolution for Honoring China Philanthropy Leadership Initiative, 2014 
The Vincent and Elinor Ostrom Workshop Fellowship, Indiana University Bloomington, 2013 
Research Assistantship and Associated Instructorship, Indiana University, 2013-2017 
Honor Cord Recipient, Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, 2013 
Junior Fellow at China Citizenship and Social Innovation Camp, Harvard University, 2012 
Susana Chou Scholarship, Macau Tong Chai Charity Foundation, 2011-2015 
 
 
RESEARCH AND PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE 
 
Research Assistant, Professor James Farmer, 2016 to present 
Research Assistant, Professor Beth Gazley, 2014 to present 
Associate Instructor, Indiana University, 2015-2016 
Research Associate, Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, 2013  
Graduate Assistant, the Fundraising School, 2012-2013 
President and Co-founder, China Philanthropy Leadership Initiative, 2011-2013 
SEE Conservation and Global Village of Beijing Fellow for Rural Development, 2010-2011  
 
 
SERVICE and PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS 
 
Professional Service: 
Discussant or Panel Chair: ARNOVA 2016 
Reviewer, Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, Academy of Management Annual 
Conference, Nonprofit Management and Leadership, Journal of Nonprofit Education 
and Research, Nonprofit Policy Forum 
Committee for Online Course Development, Harvard SEED for Social Innovation 
Board Member, Association of SPEA Ph.D. Students (ASPS), 2014 - 2015 
Adviser, Chinese Nonprofit Study Association, 2013 - 2015 
 
Professional Memberships:  
Association for Research on Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Action  
Public Management Research Association 
Academy of Management  
Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management 
China-America Association for Public Affairs 
 
